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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NAFTA
ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE AGREEMENT'S
CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS: A CASE
STUDY OF METALES Y DERIVADOS
TSEMING YANG*
INTRODUCTION
The North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation
("NAAEC"), 1 commonly referred to as the environmental side agree-
ment to the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),2 was
designed in part to counteract the potential adverse environmental effects
of liberalized trade under NAFTA. It is one of the most sophisticated in-
stitutional mechanisms targeting international environmental problems
related to trade liberalization and globalization.
Among its most visible features has been the citizen submission
process, which allows private individuals to file petitions with the North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation ("CEC" or "the
Commission") concerning a party's failure to effectively enforce its envi-
ronmental laws.3 Since the first such submission in 1995, forty-eight pe-
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I am deeply grateful to my friends Cesar
Luna, counsel for the Environmental Health Coalition ("EHC") in the Metales y Derivados
submission to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, and Jose Bravo, a former EHC
organizer, for their insights into the problems at Metales, environmental injustice, and the na-
ture of the border. I thank Cristina Lopez, Fermin Fontanes, and Kija Kummer for research
assistance.
1. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1480 [hereinafter NAAECI. The agreement entered into force Jan. 1, 1994. Id. at 1495.
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the United
States, the Government of Canada, and the Government of the United Mexican States, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. The Commission is made up of the Council, the Secretariat, and the Joint Public Ad-
visory Committee ("JPAC"). NAAEC, supra note 1, at 1485, art. 8(2). The Council consists
of the environmental ministers of each NAAEC party. Id. at 1485, art. 9. The Secretariat pro-
vides administrative support services for the Commission, including management of the citizen
submission process. Id. at 1487, art. 11. The JPAC is a multinational advisory committee that
provides for input from distinguished individuals. Id. at 1489, art. 16. For an evaluation of the
Commission's work by former officials, see Greg Block, Trade and Environment in the West-
ern Hemisphere: Expanding the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
into the Americas, 33 ENVTL. L. 501 (2003); Janine Feretti, Innovations in Managing Global-
ization: Lessons from the North American Experience, 15 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 367
(2003).
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titions have been filed.4 Ten have resulted in publicly released factual
records. 5
The Commission's progress in disposing of citizen submissions in-
dicates that it has begun to settle into a particular jurisprudence with re-
gard to its application of the process requirements and its interpretation
of the relevant NAAEC provisions. Thus, it seems appropriate to engage
in an assessment of its effectiveness in promoting transparency, its major
goal. Some commentators have taken an optimistic view, 6 and the grow-
ing number of published factual records appears to support such perspec-
tives. However, an examination of one of the more recently published
factual records, the Metales y Derivados matter, paints a darker picture.
Metales y Derivados (hereinafter "Metales") is a former battery and
lead waste recycling facility located in Tijuana, Mexico, that was shut
down in March 1994 and abandoned the next year by its U.S. owner,
Jose Kahn. 7 For years, the poor and working-class neighboring commu-
nity complained about pervasive environmental violations by the facility.
When Mexican environmental officials finally instituted criminal en-
forcement proceedings, Kahn fled across the border to the United States
rather than face charges in Mexico. Left behind were thousands of tons
of wastes and contaminated soil containing lead and other heavy metals.
As of the beginning of 2004, nine years after the facility was abandoned,
after numerous visits by U.S. and Mexican government officials and
high-ranking politicians, and after the publication of the CEC factual re-
cord detailing the enforcement failures of the Mexican government, little
has changed. 8 The piles of lead slag and the barrels and sacks of waste
were still sitting at the plant, and the toxic waste remained uncontrolled.
Contamination from industrial facilities such as Metales is not un-
usual. Serious occurrences of regulatory noncompliance with environ-
4. Through October 2004. North American Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion, Citizen Submissions on Environmental Enforcement: Current Status of Filed Submis-
sions, at http://www.cec.org (last visited Nov. 29, 2004).
5. Id. As of November 29, 2004, eleven submissions were still in the review or record
development phase. Twenty-three have been closed without development of a factual record.
Id.
6. See, e.g., John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Envi-
ronmental Law: The Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 88 (2001) ("high marks for transparency"); Mark R. Goldschmidt, The Role
of Transparency and Public Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 343
(2002).
7. North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Citizen Submissions
on Environmental Enforcement: Current Status of Filed Submissions, Metales y Derivados
Final Factual Record (SEM-98-007), Feb. 11, 2002, at 13-14, 58, available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-7-FFR-e.pdf [hereinafter Metales Factual Record].
8. However, during the summer of 2004, after this article was completed, Mexican au-
thorities began some cleaning activities. See infra Epilogue.
[Vol. 76
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mental laws are by no means isolated events, whether in Mexico 9 or the
United States.lO What is particularly disturbing about Metales, however,
has been the governmental response-at best ineffective, at worst will-
fully neglectful. If the official response to blatant and serious violations
is as minimal as it has been in Metales, is there likely to be any meaning-
ful response to the more typical, everyday forms of regulatory noncom-
pliance? Can a mechanism such as the CEC submission process, and the
transparency it promotes, effect any substantive change to the underlying
regulatory enforcement policies?
A careful examination of Metales is warranted for three reasons.
First, it points out opportunities for improving the operation of the sub-
mission process. With respect to ongoing negotiations about a Free
Trade Area of the Americas and adoption of the Central America Free
Trade Agreement, Metales is a cautionary tale counseling against sim-
plistic adoption of the NAFTA environmental side agreement and its
submission process as an equivalent environmental counterpart.
Second, an understanding of the process's success or failure yields
insights into the role of involvement by civil society in efforts to monitor
and enforce state compliance with international environmental agree-
ments. Even though the citizen submission process is a fairly novel and
innovative effort in this respect, the concept enjoys widespread support
and acceptance."l Commentators have pointed to the potential benefits
of participation by private citizens and nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs") in the monitoring and enforcement of environmental treaty
obligations. 12 The general idea has been incorporated into treaty systems
9. See, e.g., RED MEXICANA DE ACCION FRENTE AL LIBRE COMERCIO (RMALC), LA
NETA-PROYECTO EMISIONES: ESPACIO VIRTUAL & TEXAS CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES,
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER STATES:
MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS 35-38 (2d ed. 2000); Edward J. Williams, The Maqui-
ladora Industry and Environmental Degradation in the United States-Mexico Borderlands, 27
ST. MARY'S L.J. 765, 775-77 (1996).
10. For example, many severely contaminated sites are listed under the EPA Superfund
program. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund Site Contamination, at
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/contamin/index.htm (generally listing sites by category)
(last visited Nov. 29, 2004).
11. In fact, while not the subject of this article, the monitoring efforts by private indi-
viduals and NGOs of state compliance with human rights treaties has been long-standing and
well-accepted. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 938-981 (2d ed. 2000) (on human rights
NGOs).
12. See, e.g., IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(James Cameron, Jacob Werksman & Peter Roderick, eds., 1996); ENGAGING COUNTRIES:
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith
Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998); DAVID G. VICTOR, KAL RAUSTIALA, AND
EUGENE B. SKOLNIKOFF, THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1998).
20051
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as diverse as the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances 13
and the Convention on the Regulation of International Trade in Endan-
gered Species ("CITES"). 14
Third, careful examination of the NAAEC's application of the citi-
zen submission process sheds light on the implications of multilateral
environmental treaty regimes for North-South equity and environmental
justice. Even though the NAAEC encompasses only the three countries
of North America, its membership replicates the dynamics between de-
veloped and developing countries seen in many environmental agree-
ments. 1
5
This article examines the Metales matter as a case study of the ef-
fectiveness of the citizen submission process and the implications for en-
vironmental governance. Part I outlines the events that led to the filing
of the citizen submission, the handling of the submission by the CEC,
and the aftermath. Part II assesses claims of success and failure of the
process, especially with respect to promoting transparency and account-
ability. While the Metales case succeeded in promoting openness and
increasing public knowledge about governmental processes, it failed to
bring about substantive environmental improvements, enhance enforce-
ment activities, and improve public participation in environmental gov-
ernance.
Part III locates the reasons for the Metales failures at three levels:
international governance, national regulation, and market and social
mechanisms. The failures are rooted in the nature of international or-
ganizations, including the difficulty of enforcing the international obliga-
13. In addition to other Protocol parties and the Secretariat, the Montreal Protocol's Non-
compliance procedure may also be triggered by information submitted by private individuals.
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1557-58, art. 8
(1987); OZONE SECRETARIAT - UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, HANDBOOK
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER 161-164,
263-67 (5th ed. 2000), available at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/publications/index.asp. See
generally 0. Yoshida, Soft Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol's Noncompliance
Procedure and the Functions of Internal International Institutions, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 95 (1999).
14. The primary mechanism for the tracking and monitoring of shipments of specimen
and parts of endangered species across international border is TRAFFIC, a database managed
by the IUCN World Conservation Union and the Worldwide Fund for Nature. See, e.g.,
DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 1022 (2002). See generally the TRAFFIC Network Web site, at
http://www.traffic.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (stating that its mission is to ensure that
trade in wild plants and animals is not a threat to the conservation of nature).
15. For example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change assigns
"differentiated responsibilities" for financial support, technology transfer, and emissions con-
trol to developed and developing party countries. United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 ILM 849, art.
4, available at http://unfccc.int/files/ essential_background/background-publicationshtmlpdf
/application/pdf/conveng.pdf.
[Vol. 76
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tions under the NAAEC, the political economy of the border region, and
the failure of social institutions and markets.
The fourth and final part addresses the lessons for improving envi-
ronmental governance at the border and the effectiveness of the citizen
submission process. In particular, I propose a set of reforms to the sub-
mission process that will make it more autonomous from control by the
Council and the NAAEC parties. To address more substantive issues of
environmental governance, especially political accountability, at the bor-
der, I also propose the creation of a binational border environmental
quality district with a commission that is directly elected and accountable
to border residents. These reforms are designed to address the underly-
ing problems of border environment management, not just the symptoms.
After this article was completed and while it was going through this
journal's editing process, encouraging news has emerged indicating that
the persistence of the community activists has finally paid off and moved
government officials to begin the process of site remediation. A brief
epilogue summarizes these developments.
Ultimately, the Metales case illustrates the serious risks that a com-
bination of rapid industrialization, liberalized trade, and inadequate envi-
ronmental regulatory structures can present to the affected populations
and the environment. Such conditions are present not only in North
America but also in many developing countries. Understanding Metales
can teach us lessons about dealing with such problems elsewhere.
I. THE STORY OF METALES Y DERIVADOS
A. Metales, Jose Kahn, and Colonia Chilpancingo
In 1986, New Frontier Trading Company, a California corporation,
moved its lead battery recycling facility into a light-industrial neighbor-
hood, Mesa de Otay Industrial Park, in Tijuana, Mexico. The facility,
named Metales y Derivados, had been operated as a Mexican maqui-
ladora plant since 1972 in another part of Tijuana. New Frontier and its
owner, Jose Kahn, were based in San Diego, just across the U.S.-Mexico
border. 16
In many respects, Metales was hardly different from many other fa-
cilities in Tijuana and all along the U.S.-Mexico border. Incorporated as
a maquiladora plant, Metales was able to take advantage of a Mexican
law17 that provides favorable tax and tariff treatment to manufacturing
facilities, many of them assembly plants. Maquiladora plants usually
16. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 20.
17. Programa de Industrializaci6n Fronteriza (Border Industrialization Program) (1965).
2005)
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import raw materials from the United States and then re-export the fin-
ished products. Their location on the Mexican side of the border gives
them the benefit of cheap Mexican labor while maintaining proximity to
the U.S. consumer market.
But Metales did differ in a crucial aspect from many other plants
operated by large U.S. and multinational corporations. Unlike facilities
that assembled auto parts, appliances, or consumer goods, Metales recy-
cled wastes to produce refined lead and phosphorized copper granulates.
Its raw materials were "lead-containing soils, telephone cable sheathing,
lead oxide, discarded automotive and industrial batteries (that were cut
open manually with an axe) and other types of lead scrap. ... [In 1989, it
ran] two lead smelting furnaces, two crucibles for lead refining, and two
copper smelting furnaces .... The lead refining crucibles lacked an emis-
sion control system. The furnaces were fired by fuel oil and diesel."18
Metales was in trouble almost from the beginning. The toxic wastes
generated by the recycling plant-including lead slag, copper slag,
empty containers formerly containing arsenic, phosphorus and phospho-
ric acid, battery casings, heavy metal sludges, and waste oils from ser-
vice elevators-were poorly managed. 19 Initially, most of the wastes
were kept in open-air piles. Later, they were stored "in an enclosed area;
in an open, roofed area; on concrete floors on racks; and on bare ground
on the property." 20
By the time Jose Kahn abandoned the recycling plant, at least six
thousand, and perhaps as much as seven thousand, cubic meters of con-
taminated materials containing lead, antimony, cadmium, and arsenic
had been generated and left untreated at the site.2 1 As of February 2003,
they could still be found lying in several piles on the ground, contained
within the soil, and stored in sacks and drums. 22 Lead concentrations
have been measured at up to 178,400 milligrams per kilogram of sub-
soil.23 A 1999 Mexican government report stated that "the premises of
the former company are a major health risk and... the wastes found
there must be given suitable treatment."' 24 The report further recom-
mended that "urgent measures ... be implemented immediately" and that
the government "initiate restoration measures immediately." 25  The
18. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7 at 21.
19. Id. at 22.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 26.
22. Id. at 26, 33. Also, my own personal observations in February 2003.
23. Id. at 26.
24. Id. at 25.
25. Id. at 27.
[Vol. 76
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cheapest method of addressing the waste, in situ treatment, was estimated
at about 6.2 million pesos ($650,000 in 1999 dollars). 26
More than a thousand people, residents of Colonia Chilpancingo,
lived just 150 yards down a small ravine from the facility. 27 Many in the
community complained early on about the plant's polluting activities, its
illegal hazardous-waste disposal practices, potential groundwater con-
tamination, and the health problems that these conditions allegedly
caused among the residents. 28 Reports of skin and eye irritation and of
gastrointestinal problems were common, as were dizziness, nausea, and
other symptoms consistent with lead exposure. Concerns about impacts
on children were especially severe. Families reported instances of in-
fants with asthma and chronic skin irritations, newborns with birth de-
fects, and babies with hydrocephalus. 29
B. Enforcement Efforts by Mexican and U.S. Authorities
According to Mexican government records, the recycling plant was
inspected five times between 1987 and 1993.30 Each time, serious envi-
ronmental violations were found. At one point, in 1991, the government
ordered a temporary shutdown of the facility, but the plant was soon al-
lowed to recommence operations. 31 It was not until March 28, 1994,
that the government shut down the facility permanently. 32 Mexican au-
thorities filed criminal charges against Jose Kahn in 1993, during the fi-
nal plant closure proceedings, and in 1995 issued a warrant for his ar-
26. Id. at 27, 116.
27. See Petition Before the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Under Articles
13, 14, and 15 of the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, available at
http://www.environmentalhealth.org/CEC3.html#Petition (last visited Jan. 26, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter EHC Petition].
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. Some of these symptoms are consistent with environmental health effects of the
lead and other heavy metals found at the Metales site. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at
119-26. On the link of lead pollutants to hydrocephalus (abnormal accumulation of cerebro-
spinal fluid in the ventricles of the brain), see M. Vinceti et al., "Risk of Birth Defects In A
Population Exposed To Environmental Lead Pollution," 278 SCIENCE OF THE TOTAL
ENVIRONMENT 23-30 (2001). However, a recent (post-abandonment) health study of the
community's children also showed that average blood lead levels were 6 gg/dL, lower than the
10 gtg/dL threshold considered to be elevated. Id. at 8. For a more general discussion of con-
cerns about such public-health issues associated with the maquiladora industry, see Kelly L.
Reblin, NAFTA and the Environment: Dealing with Abnormally High Birth Defect Rates
among Children of Texas-Mexico Border Towns, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 929 (1996).
30. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 129-34, tbl., "Summary of Actions by
Mexican Authorities with Respect to Metales y Derivados."
31. Id. at 129-30.
32. Id. at 132.
2005]
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rest.33 New Frontier Trading Company and Kahn then abandoned the
plant.
Back in the United States, Jose Kahn became the subject of a
twenty-six-count criminal indictment related to the illegal transport of
hazardous materials to Mexico. 34 In August 1992, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney's Office pressed charges against him for his
company's shipments of hazardous materials to the Metales plant.35 He
pleaded guilty in 1993 to two felony counts, a $50,000 fine, and three
years probation.36 Kahn served no prison time.
The conditions of probation required Kahn to build a retaining wall
around the facility and to contain the existing lead slag pile to prevent re-
leases into the air or ground. The plea agreement also required him to
pursue all license and permit applications for implementation of an elec-
trowinning process 37 that could further recycle existing and future sup-
plies of slag at the site. Finally, Kahn was to "obey all laws of Califor-
nia, the U.S. and Mexico, including the 'La Paz' agreement which
requires that all waste material imported from the United States be 'repa-
triated' upon completion of processing." 38 At the end of the probation
term, the agreement allowed Kahn to apply to the court for reduction of
the charges to a misdemeanor and expungement. That apparently oc-
curred, as a search of Los Angeles County Superior Court electronic re-
cords in 2003 did not show Mr. Kahn's felony guilty plea.39 While Mr.
Kahn's penalty was seemingly reduced, there is no evidence that the re-
patriation of waste ever occurred.
Initially, the Mexican government failed to take any action with re-
spect to the abandoned facility and the piles of toxic waste. United
States authorities had no jurisdiction to act because the facility was lo-
cated in Mexico. 40 In 2001, community activists held demonstrations in
front of the offices of New Frontier and Kahn's residence in San
33. Id. at 131. See also Peter Fritsch, Mexican Toxic-Waste Case Shows NAFTA 's Limits,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at A12. The exact status of this criminal proceeding remains un-
clear and has been unavailable to the public because of Mexican laws restricting access to such
records.
34. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25189.5(c) (1992); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-
66699 (1992).
35. Felony Compl., People v. Keelco Anodes, Inc., et al., Case No. BA062242 (L.A. Su-
per. Ct. 1992), document on file with author; Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 22.
36. Id. (Transcript of sentencing hearing, April 15, 1993, Case No. BA 062242).
37. Electrowinning is the recovery of metals from a solution by electrolysis.
38. Plea Agreement, dated April 15, 1993 (on file with author).
39. Court records may be accessed, for a nominal fee, through LA Court Online, avail-
able at http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org.
40. This position has been expressed, off the record, by EPA officials in personal conver-
sations.
[Vol. 76
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Diego.4 1 Mexican officials eventually had the lead slag piles covered
with plastic tarps to protect against rain and wind. Officials also repaired
the cinder-block wall surrounding part of the recycling plant. In January
1995, they removed more than four thousand kilograms of explosive red
phosphorus. 42
Little else was done afterward. At one point, citizens took measures
into their own hands by painting the word peligro ("danger") together
with a skull and crossbones in a number of places on the wall.43 The en-
vironmental and public health dangers of the site, however, remained
largely unabated. During rainstorms, runoff carried the toxic wastes into
the neighboring community. The acidity of the waste leachate44 seri-
ously corroded portions of the wall. Passersby, including children, could
easily enter the property by scaling the walls or slipping through the two-
stranded barbed wire fence. Occasionally, homeless people took up resi-
dence there.45 A bus company even attempted to use the property as a
parking lot for its vehicles.46
C. The CEC Citizen Submission Process
By October 1998, the community activists were fed up. On behalf
of Colonia Chilpancingo, two community organizations, the San Diego-
based Environmental Health Coalition ("EHC") and the Mexico-based
Comit6 Ciudadano Pro Restauraci6n del Canon del Padre y Servicios
Comunitarios, filed a citizen submission ("EHC submission") with the
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation ("CEC"). 47
The petition alleged that the Mexican government had failed "to effec-
tively enforce its environmental law" against Metales y Derivados and
the facility's owners. 48
The submission process, also called the Article 14/15 process, is
primarily managed by the Commission's Secretariat. Under Article 14
of the NAAEC, the Secretariat of the CEC "may consider a submission
from any non-governmental organization or person asserting that a Party
41. Victory at Last! Community Celebrates Metales y Derivados Cleanup Agreement, 23
TOXINFORMER (Envtl. Health Coalition), Aug. 2004, at 3-5, available at
http://www.environmentalhealth.org/AUG2004.pdf (last visited January 5, 2005).
42. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 52.
43. Id. at 58.
44. Leachate is wastewater that results when rainwater percolates through a slag pile,
leaching out some of the toxic substances from the pile and carrying them wherever it flows.
45. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 58.
46. EHC Petition, supra note 27 (pt. 2, "Factual Background").
47. For an overview of the submission process, see David L. Markell, The Commission
for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submission Process, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
545 (2000) [hereinafter Markell, Commission]; Knox, supra note 6, at 59-67.
48. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 9.
2005]
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is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law." 49 The petition
must satisfy threshold requirements with respect to language of the sub-
mission, identification and residence of the submitter, specificity and
purpose of the allegations, and notice to the alleged offending party.50
The Secretariat must then determine whether to request a response
from the party targeted by the submission. The decision to request a re-
sponse is based on four factors: (1) whether the submission "alleges
harm" to the submitter; (2) whether it raises matters that, if studied,
would further the goals of the NAAEC; (3) whether the submitter has
pursued available private remedies; and (4) whether "the submission is
drawn exclusively from mass media reports. '51 If a response is merited,
the responding party (designated by the agreement as the "Party Con-
cerned") is required to advise the Secretariat within sixty days "whether
the matter is the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceed-
ing, in which case the Secretariat shall proceed no further." 52 The re-
sponding party is also encouraged to provide other information, such as
whether there have been relevant past judicial or administrative proceed-
ings, whether relevant private remedies are available to the submitter,
and whether the submitter has pursued any such remedies.
If the Secretariat finds that the submission warrants development of
a factual record, its recommendation and reasons are forwarded to the
CEC Council. 53 The Council, made up of the Administrator of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the environmental minis-
ters of Canada and Mexico, may then, upon a two-thirds vote, direct the
Secretariat to prepare a factual record.54 Information is drawn from
available sources, including the NAAEC parties, private individuals, and
NGOs. 55 Before the factual record is finalized, the parties have forty-
five days to comment on its accuracy. After incorporation of "appropri-
ate" comments, the final factual record is submitted to the Council. 56 By
a two-thirds vote, the Council can allow the public release of the final
factual record. 57
49. NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 14(1).
50. To be precise: the petition must be in a language designated by the alleged violating
party; specific allegations must be accompanied by any documentation on which they are
based; the petition must "appear[] to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harass-
ing industry"; and it must include any response the party may have already made to the peti-
tioner's written notice. Id. at art. 14(l)(d).
51. Id. at art. 14(2)(a)-(d); Ignacia S. Moreno et al., Free Trade and the Environment:
The NAFTA, the NAAEC, and Implications for the Future, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 405, 444-45
n.253 (1999).
52. NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 14(3)(a).
53. Id. at art. 15(1).
54. Id. at art. 15(2).
55. Id. at art. 15(4).
56. Id. at art. 15(5)-(6).
57. Id. at art. 15(7).
[Vol. 76
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The CEC submission process offers no substantive remedy and no
sanctions. 58 At best, a meritorious complaint can be rewarded with an
investigation of the allegations and the development and possible publi-
cation of a factual record on the enforcement failure. The publicity, pub-
lic pressure, and official validation of community concerns generated by
a published factual record do, however, present an opportunity to offi-
cially prompt and provide a justification for willing government officials
to take appropriate substantive remedial steps. Finally, publication can
serve as a potential trigger for the bilateral dispute settlement process
outlined in Part V of the NAAEC.
5 9
In its Metales submission, the EHC raised three specific enforce-
ment failures by Mexico: (1) Mexico's failure, under Article 170 of the
General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (Ley
General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y la Protecci6n al Ambiente
("LGEEPA")), to take "proper safety measures to prevent the Metales y
Derivados site from posing an imminent risk to the ecological balance
and to public health;" (2) its failure, under LGEEPA's Article 134, to
take "appropriate actions to control or prevent soil contamination in and
near the Metales y Derivados site;" and (3) its failure, under Article 415
of the Federal Criminal Code (C6digo Penal Federal-CPF), Article 3 of
the International Extradition Law (Ley de Extradici6n Internacional), and
Articles 1 and 2 of the Extradition Treaty Between the United States of
America and the United Mexican States, to procure extradition of the
owner of Metales y Derivados from the United States to face criminal
charges in Mexico. 60
During the Secretariat's review of the submission, at least two un-
expected developments occurred that disturbed the submitters. First, the
Secretariat investigated only the merits of the allegations related to Arti-
cles 170 and 134 of LGEEPA. Mexico's failure to seek extradition was
determined by the Secretariat to be unreviewable under the NAAEC's
Article 14/15 process. Mexico asserted that the substantive environ-
mental provisions on which the criminal enforcement proceeding was
based had been repealed during a revision of the Mexican penal code.
No savings clause had been included. 6 1 The Mexican government con-
58. Markell, Commission, supra note 47, at 571.
59. Moreno et al., supra note 51, at 405, 444.
60. See EHC Petition, supra note 27; see also Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at
14.
61. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 14 & nn.2, 16. The actual argument was
that the substantive provision cited by the submissions, CPF 415, was incorrect. Instead, the
relevant provisions for the criminal prosecution were LGEEPA 183, 184, and 185. However,
these provisions had been repealed during a legislative revision, thus depriving enforcers of the
necessary substantive violation. Id. at 16.
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cluded, and the Secretariat agreed, that the implicit repeal of the underly-
ing substantive environmental law provision negated the claim.
Second, from the outset the Mexican government insisted that its re-
sponse to the submission, filed June 1, 1999, be kept confidential.
62
Surprisingly, that designation prevented the public release not just of
specific information or excerpts from the response, but of the response in
its entirety. Mexico's response to the enforcement failure allegations
remained unavailable to the public until June 28, 2001, when Mexico
withdrew the confidentiality designation. 63 As a result, much of the
CEC process remained shrouded in secrecy.
On May 16, 2000, the Council instructed the Secretariat to develop
a factual record on the EHC submission. 64 For this purpose, the Secre-
tariat requested information from a broad range of organizations and in-
dividuals, including Mexican government officials. In the invitation to
furnish information, the Secretariat flagged issues such as "obstacles to
the effective enforcement of LGEEPA 170 and 134 in regard to the
Metales y Derivados site." 65
The Secretariat submitted its draft factual record to the Council on
October 1, 2001, for a forty-five-day comment period. The final factual
record, addressing comments by Canada and the United States, was
completed on November 29, 2001.66 By unanimous vote, the Council
approved the public release of the final factual record on February 7,
2002.67
The factual record declined to draw any legal conclusions as to
whether Mexico had failed "to effectively enforce its environmental
law." 68 With the exception of the extradition failure, however, it did
substantiate the alleged factual predicates of the enforcement failures.
Mexico's response to the allegations focused exclusively on re-
source availability issues. It reported that the Tijuana office of the Mexi-
can Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection ("PROFEPA") had,
as of that date, a "total of 14 staff persons, including 6 inspectors and 2
lawyers, who worked on proceedings relating to the maquiladora indus-
try (740 companies in September 2000) as well as natural resources ....
62. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 9 & n. 1.
63. Id.
64. Council Res. 00-03, Instruction to the Secretariat of the Commission for Environ-
mental Cooperation ("CEC") with Regard to the Assertion That Mexico Is Failing to Effec-
tively Enforce Articles 134 and 170 of the General Law on Ecological Balance and Environ-
mental Protection (SEM-98-007), Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, app. 1 at 63.
65. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, app. 5 at 87.
66. GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION 291, tbl. (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003). Mexico did not sub-
mit any comments.
67. Id.
68. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 59-60.
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[A] total of 1,200 proceedings have been instituted since 1993, and 800
of them remain open. [However,] 4 or 5 proceedings may relate to the
same company." 69  Lack of adequate personnel and other resources,
Mexico implied, was to blame for its enforcement failures. The factual
record also pointed to lack of resources as a barrier to engaging in envi-
ronmental cleanups of the type necessitated by Metales. Mexico thus
sought only to explain and justify its inaction rather than to contest the
accuracy of the submission's allegations.
D. The Aftermath
The aftermath of the factual record has been less than enchanting
for community activists. In 2002, in response to continued community
protests and demonstrations, PROFEPA put up new warning signs and
covered up the wastes again with plastic tarps. By early 2003, when I
visited the facility, the tarps were gone.70 No other significant remedial
action had been taken. In fact, the fencing and walls surrounding the site
had deteriorated further and were largely in a state of disrepair. People
could enter the site easily, and the contaminated wastes were readily car-
ried off the site by wind and rain.
Mexican government officials have never pressed for Jose Kahn's
extradition. As a result, California and federal authorities in the United
States have not sought to execute the warrant for his arrest. In the sum-
mer of 2003, Victor Lichtinger, then head of the Mexican environmental
ministry, promised to address the contamination. Unfortunately, not
more than a month later, Lichtinger was dismissed from his job by Presi-
dent Vincente Fox. On the positive side, Mexican legislators familiar
with the Metales matter have discussed the possibility of creating a
Mexican equivalent of the U.S. Superfund program as a way of provid-
ing cleanup funds for future abandoned hazardous-waste sites.71
As for Jose Kahn, he has not set foot in Mexico since abandoning
the Metales plant. Kahn has served no time related to the Metales viola-
tions. He still lives only miles away from the border in San Diego, Cali-
fornia. 72 New Frontier remains an active San Diego-based corpora-
tion.73 Kahn did apply to the North American Development Bank 74 for
69. Id. at 43.
70. It is unclear what led to their destruction or possible removal.
71. Interview with Cesar Luna, Counsel for the Environmental Health Commission in the
Metales y Derivados submission to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (Mar. 22,
2004).
72. Fritsch, supra note 33.
73. The company has had estimated annual sales of between $700,000 and $1 million.
EHC Petition, supra note 27, at 8.
2005]
HeinOnline  -- 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 455 2005
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
an $850,000 loan to cap the site with asphalt or concrete, the most rudi-
mentary of options to address the hazards of the wastes. However, the
loan application was denied in 2003. 75 As of early 2004, the residents of
Colonia Chilpancingo and environmental activists still held protest rallies
on a regular basis, but government officials remained substantively unre-
sponsive.
II. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE METALES CASE
What does the Metales case tell us about the success or failure of
the citizen submission process? This section begins by presenting the
case in the light most favorable to proponents of the process, and then
sets out a more critical assessment.
A. The Citizen Submission Process Worked! Transparency,
Monitoring, and Facilitation of Domestic Environmental
Enforcement
If viewed narrowly, within the declared purpose of the citizen sub-
mission process, the Metales case can be seen as a success. The process
was designed to create a factual record documenting both the submitter's
assertions "that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental
law" 76 and the response of the Party concerned. 77 It accomplished that
goal. The CEC published the complaints of the residents of Colonia
Chilpancingo, documented the environmental offenses of Metales y De-
rivados, and gave Mexican governmental authorities an opportunity to
respond.
The record's utility goes beyond the compilation of existing docu-
ments and information provided by the petitioner and the Mexican gov-
ernment, however. Given the CEC's own factual investigation and
evaluation of the claims and responses, it is a quasi-independent deter-
mination of the facts underlying the submission's events. It creates
transparency with respect to Mexico's environmental regulatory policies
by telling the public what actually happened near the plant in Tijuana.
Transparency can have value beyond increasing the public's knowl-
edge about the processes of enforcing and implementing environmental
laws. A credible account of the events can "promote... public partici-
74. A regional development bank created at the same time as the CEC to provide financ-
ing for environmental infrastructure projects.
75. Joe Cantlupe and Dana Wilkie, Cleanup Slated At Toxic Plant: U.S.-Mexico Plan
Targets Closed Facility In Tijuana, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 16, 2004, at B 1.
76. NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 14(1).
77. Knox, supra note 6, at 87.
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pation in the development of environmental laws, regulations and poli-
cies." 78 Information about enforcement failures may also be used by
private citizens, NGOs, politicians, and others to trigger domestic
mechanisms, whether legal or political, to change the behavior of en-
forcement authorities. With greater public awareness, public pressure
might even shame Mexican government officials into acting. Overall
environmental quality should be improved.
If Antonia Chayes and the late Abram Chayes are correct in attribut-
ing the failure of states to comply with their international treaty obliga-
tions primarily to inadvertence, lack of capacity, or transitional difficul-
ties,79 a credible and neutral account of domestic environmental
enforcement failure should lead to self-corrective actions. An accurate
factual record would show a party its mistakes and induce a willing party
to reexamine and adjust its regulatory and enforcement policies so as to
correct the enforcement failure. It could even avoid future enforcement
failures without the use of coercion.
If one is skeptical of such possibilities, the information generated by
the factual record can be instrumental in other ways. To the extent that
the factual record documents a violation of the NAAEC requirements,
specifically with regard to the effective enforcement requirement, 80 it
may serve as the basis for (informal) bilateral processes between the
NAAEC parties seeking compliance. Either on its own initiative or in
response to pressure from its citizens, another NAAEC party might util-
ize diplomatic or other government-to-government channels to induce
behavioral changes. In essence, a factual record not only facilitates self-
corrective actions but also, in the Chayes' terminology, the "manage-
ment" of that party's compliance by others. 81
If the factual record uncovers a persistent failure to enforce the
party's environmental laws, the NAAEC's Part V formal bilateral con-
sultation and dispute resolution process can be triggered. Pursuant to
Part V, parties may seek consultation and dispute resolution as to
"whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by [a] Party to ef-
fectively enforce its environmental law." Factual records provide the in-
formation and necessary factual predicates to this process. A successful
Part V claim may even lead to a penalty assessment and trade sanctions
of up to ".007 percent of total trade in goods between the Parties." 82
78. NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 1(h).
79. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 10 (1995).
80. NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 5(1).
81. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 79, at 22-28; Knox, supra note 6, at 59-67.
82. NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 34(5) and Annex 34. However, Canadian penalty as-
sessments may be enforced in Canadian courts.
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Success of the Metales submissions may be seen not only in the ac-
tual completion of a factual record substantiating the submitters' allega-
tions, but also in the ability of the submission process to increase trans-
parency with respect to Mexican environmental regulatory and
enforcement policies. In turn, transparency can potentially improve pub-
lic accountability by environmental officials, promote public participa-
tion, encourage the engagement of informal, managerial efforts to bring
about compliance, and potentially trigger the use of formal state-to-state
dispute settlement mechanisms. Metales thus seems to validate the im-
portance, utility, and success of the citizen submission process.
B. The Citizen Submission Process Failed! The Lack of
Accountability for Actual Outcomes
In spite of the ability of factual records to increase public informa-
tion about national environmental policies, a more critical perspective on
the submission process is appropriate. An appraisal that is narrow and
does not consider the functions that the submission process was expected
to serve is incomplete. Even if the process resulted in the successful
creation of a factual record, the ultimate goal of transparency-improved
accountability of CEC and national officials for their decisions-has not
been served.
If transparency is intended to trigger substantive remediation of
specific environmental and public-health problems, to promote environ-
mental enforcement, and to increase public participation, the submission
process comes up far short. First, the process itself provides no substan-
tive environmental remedy for enforcement failures and has not had such
effects in Metales. Second, the ability to "shame" governments into
stepping up their enforcement actions is quite limited because the
NAAEC explicitly recognizes certain excuses, and because the substan-
tive scope of the factual record does not include other relevant govern-
ments, such as the United States. Finally, the process has failed to de-
mocratize environmental governance and promote accountability to the
people who are most directly affected.
1. The Failure to Remediate Environmental and Public-health
Problems
One of the greatest concerns of the residents of Colonia Chil-
pancingo has been remediation of the contaminated soils and restoration
of the environment. As of the beginning of 2004, the submission process
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had yet to produce concrete, substantive, environmentally beneficial con-
sequences. 83 The factual record acknowledged as much:
[T]he information presented by the Secretariat in this factual record
reveals that, as a matter of fact,... no actions have been taken to re-
store the soil to a condition in which it can be used in the industrial
activities corresponding to the zoning of the area, i.e., the Mesa de
Otay Industrial Park in the city of Tijuana, Baja California, in order
to enforce effectively LGEEPA Article 134 [which calls for the resto-
ration and reestablishment of the quality of soil contaminated by haz-
ardous waste]. 84
Since the publication of the factual record, EPA has allocated re-
sources to study site cleanup options. As of early 2004, neither the
Mexican or the U.S. government, however, has made funding available
to clean up the site. The wastes still remain. To the extent that the sub-
mission process was designed to address the broader environmental con-
cerns about pollution, environmental degradation, and public-health im-
pacts resulting from U.S.-Mexico trade, it has not met those expectations.
There are at least two ready responses. First, one might argue that
the submission process was never designed to provide a substantive rem-
edy. Raising this issue not only restates the obvious but also seems to
point out a non-issue. If the agreement's drafters did not intend to pro-
vide substantive environmental and public-health remedies, its ineffec-
tiveness in mitigating specific environmental hazards cannot be seen as a
failure on the part of the agreement.
Second, Metales arguably falls outside the scope of problems the
NAAEC was designed to solve. Metales began its operations in 1986 and
generated most of the problem wastes before the adoption of NAFTA in
1994. One would be hard-pressed to find a cause-effect relationship be-
tween the adoption of NAFTA and the environmental and public-health
effects at the Metales site and the surrounding community. 85 If the
NAAEC was only intended to address the adverse environmental effects
of NAFTA, the contamination of Metales would fall outside of what the
NAAEC and the submission process were designed to cover.
Yet such responses seem too facile. The NAFTA environmental
side agreement, as its name intimates, was offered to environmentalists
and many others concerned about the potential environmental conse-
83. But see infra Epilogue.
84. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 59-60.
85. See, e.g., Sanford E. Gaines, NAFTA as a Symbol on the Border, 51 UCLA L. REV.
143, 162-75 (2003). Sanford Gaines has suggested that the positive developments in Metales,
including the shut-down, rather than the negative ones should be attributed to the NAAEC. Id.
at 159-60.
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quences of liberalized trade as part of several concessions for dropping
or weakening their opposition to NAFTA. 86 Thus, a contextualized as-
sessment of the effectiveness and success of the NAAEC cannot stop
with an inquiry into the agreement's written terms and obligations. It is
also necessary to consider the promises made and expectations created
about possible and likely environmental outcomes. 87
During the public debates and congressional battles about the adop-
tion of NAFTA, environmentalists repeatedly raised at least three serious
issues: (1) the potential adverse environmental consequences of rapid in-
dustrialization on the Mexican environment, especially by growth of the
maquiladora industry, 88 (2) the Mexican government's lack of capacity
to deal with such issues, and (3) pressures on the United States to relax
its environmental standards in response to competitive pressures by less
stringently regulated Mexican industries.89 These issues took on particu-
lar urgency because Mexico had for many years neglected the problems
of pollution and environmental degradation. 90
In response, and as part of efforts to persuade the public and con-
gressional opponents to support NAFTA through the grant of fast-track
trade negotiation authority, the elder Bush Administration made several
promises in 1991. It pledged to ensure that the final version of NAFTA
would contain environmental safeguards, to launch a number of coopera-
86. See, e.g., REMARKS OF SENATOR MAX BAUCUS ON "NAFTA IN THE CONGRESS" TO
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT (Jan. 29, 1993), reprinted in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCESS 269, 269-72 (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995). See also Markell, Commission, supra
note 47, at 547 & note 6; Kal Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review in the NAAEC,
in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION 260 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003).
87. For general overviews bf the NAFTA negotiation process and the role that environ-
mental concerns played, see BARBARA HOGENBOOM, MEXICO AND THE NAFTA
ENVIRONMENT DEBATE: THE TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1998);
JOHN J. AUDLEY, GREEN POLITICS AND GLOBAL TRADE: NAFTA AND THE FUTURE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1997); Joseph F. DiMento & Pamela M. Doughman, Soft Teeth in
the Back of the Mouth: the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement Implemented, 10 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 651, 658-81 (1998).
88. See NATIONAL WILDLIPE FEDERATION ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS RELATED TO A
UNITED STATES-MEXICO-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Nov. 27, 1990), reprinted in
NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 631, 632-34 (Daniel Magraw ed.,
1995); STATEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL ON ADMINISTRATION
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Aug. 12, 1992), re-
printed in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 682 (Daniel Magraw ed.,
1995); SIERRA CLUB STATEMENT OPPOSING NAFTA: NOT THIS NAFTA (Sept. 13, 1993),
reprinted in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 736, 736-38 (Daniel
Magraw ed., 1995). See also HOGENBOOM, supra note 87, at 130-31, 136-37.
89. See, e.g., Moreno et al., supra note 51, at 405, 410-13, and accompanying notes
(1999); David L. Markell & John H. Knox, The Innovative North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 3-4 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003).
90. HOGENBOOM, supra note 87, at 71-96.
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tive environmental efforts with Mexico, and to engage in an environ-
mental review of liberalized trade. 91 It also initiated the first discussions
regarding the creation of a North American Environmental Commis-
sion.92 Mexico itself, in anticipation of and accompanying the NAFTA
negotiations, embarked on a high-profile effort to upgrade its environ-
mental regulatory system. 93 Yet these efforts were unable to quell public
skepticism. 94
To ensure congressional support and passage of NAFTA's imple-
menting legislation, the Clinton Administration conducted a further envi-
ronmental review of NAFTA and negotiated the environmental side
agreement, the NAAEC, as well as additional bilateral agreements with
Mexico. 95 These efforts promised that the environmental safeguards in-
corporated into NAFTA, in combination with the environmental agree-
ment, would prevent the worries of environmentalists from becoming re-
ality. 96 Moreover, liberalized trade and higher standards of living would
make Mexico a wealthier nation. There would not only be more re-
sources to address environmental problems and enforce environmental
regulations, but also an increase in Mexican society's commitment to and
valuation of environmental quality.
9 7
91. See Moreno et al., supra note 51, at 414. See also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, REVIEW OF U.S.-MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1992). See also Presi-
dent Announces Three-Year Program to Clean Up, Prevent Pollution at Mexican Border, 22
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2427 (Feb. 28, 1992).
92. See Joint Press Release, Ministers Responsible for the Environment of Canada, Mex-
ico and the United States (Sept. 17, 1992), reprinted in NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 79-80 (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995); Letter from President Bush to
Chairmen Lloyd Bentsen and Dan Rostenkowski (Sept. 15, 1992), reprinted in NAFTA AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 237-38 (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995). See
HOGENBOOM, supra note 87, at 96-106.
93. See Peter M. Emerson & Robert A. Collinge, The Environmental Side of North
American Free Trade, in TERRY ANDERSON, NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: STUDIES ON
THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICA 51-52 (1993).
94. See Moreno et al., supra note 51, at 415.
95. Id.; see also Clinton Endorses NAFTA with Certain Reservations, 9 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 1718, 1720 (Oct. 7, 1992).
96. See, e.g., Environmental Implications of NAFTA: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. (1993); Report of the Administration on the
North American Free Trade Agreement and Actions Taken in Fulfillment of the May 1, 1991
Commitments, reprinted in NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 239,
245-49 (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995) [hereinafter Report of the Administration on NAFTA].
97. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE NAFTA: REPORT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, reprinted in NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCESS 393, 485-96 (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995) [hereinafter The NAFTA: Report]; NORTH
AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, FREE TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: THE PICTURE BECOMES CLEARER 1-2 (2002) (citing Gene M. Grossman &
Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade Agreement, in THE
MEXICO-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 13 (Peter M. Garber ed., 1994)); Report of the Ad-
ministration on NAFTA, supra note 96, at 243-44; Kevin P. Gallagher, The CEC and Envi-
ronmental Quality: Assessing the Mexican Experience, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH
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The final NAFTA package, 98 which included the NAAEC, the Bor-
der Environment Cooperation Commission, and the North American De-
velopment Bank,99 was a grand compromise. Those concerned about the
environment made concessions, relented in their opposition, or decided
to support NAFTA. In return, they were left with assurances, promises,
and expectations that the scheme negotiated by the Bush and Clinton
Administrations would address their concerns.100 Thus, a broad, contex-
tualized assessment of the NAAEC must consider not only whether the
agreement's terms and written goals have been fulfilled but also how
well environmentalists' concerns have been met.
In the case of the Metales submissions, even if the lead contamina-
tion and adverse environmental effects cannot be causally attributed to
the adoption of NAFTA, absolving the NAAEC and subsequent envi-
ronmental regulatory efforts from all responsibility for them seems alto-
gether unjustified in light of the NAFTA-NAAEC adoption debates and
negotiation background. Environmentalists and community activists had
been well aware of environmental problems at the border and of the need
to remediate them. These concerns had specifically been brought to the
attention of the first Bush and Clinton Administrations and the U.S. pub-
lic as reasons for opposing NAFTA. l0 l Because U.S.-Mexico coopera-
tive environmental initiatives at the border and the NAAEC were in-
AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 117-20 (David L. Markell &
John H. Knox eds., 2003); Steven Globerman, The Environmental Impacts of Trade Liberali-
zation, in TERRY ANDERSON, NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: STUDIES ON THE ECONOMIC
FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICA 33-35 (1993); HOGENBOOM, supra note 87, at 179-81, 184-85.
See generally Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment,
110 Q. J. OF ECON. 353 (1995).
98. For a description of the NAFTA compromise package, see, e.g., Robert Housman,
The North American Free Trade Agreement's Lessons for Reconciling Trade and the Envi-
ronment, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 379, 394-422 (1994); Robert Housman & Paul Orbuch, Inte-
grating Labor and Environmental Concerns into the North American Free Trade Agreement:
A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 719 (1993).
99. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environmental Cooperative
Commission and North American Development Bank, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 12,516 (Nov.
16, 1993).
100. For example, the National Wildlife Federation stated after negotiation of the NAAEC
had concluded that the "NAFTA, in combination with the newly formed North American
Commission on Environmental Cooperation, will assure that :... environmental clean-up pro-
jects along the U.S.-Mexico border will receive adequate funding." National Wildlife Federa-
tion Statement Supporting NAFTA (Sept. 14, 1993), reprinted in NAFTA AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 739 (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995).
101. See, e.g., Justin R. Ward, Natural Resources Defense Council Statement Regarding
Environmental Protection in the North American Free Trade Agreement (Sept. 3, 1991), re-
printed in NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 658, 660-63 (Daniel
Magraw ed., 1995); see also Markell & Knox, supra note 89, at 4; cf NAFTA and Supplemen-
tal Agreements: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong. (1993)
(testimony of Ambassador Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative), reprinted in NAFTA
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 279, 281-82 (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995)
(referencing border cleanup needs).
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tended to respond to all of these concerns, they should also be held re-
sponsible in that regard. 10 2 Metales should not have lingered as an un-
controlled and unremediated waste site.
Ultimately, Metales poses the question of whether the NAAEC and
its companion agreements have adequately addressed the substantive
concerns that inspired environmental activists to oppose NAFTA in the
first place. To the extent that some of the most obvious expectations
about the adverse environmental consequences of liberalized trade be-
tween the United States and Mexico have been left unresolved, the effec-
tiveness of the NAAEC is debatable.
2. The Failure to Promote Enforcement
Even apart from a contextualized assessment, the submission proc-
ess and the factual record have failed to achieve another widely ac-
knowledged goal: to serve as the CEC's response to alleged instances of
enforcement failures, in particular by encouraging, pressuring, or sham-
ing party states to step up their enforcement efforts. The limited scope
and content of the factual records bear much of the responsibility for this
failure. Factual records do not draw any legal conclusions with respect
to the submission's allegations, and they are narrowly focused on the al-
legations relating to the target party. The resulting understanding of
causal connections between NAAEC obligations, regulatory and en-
forcement policies, and environmental impacts is limited and incomplete.
The Metales case illustrates these two shortcomings well.
Lack of legal conclusions. Like other factual records, the Metales
record draws no legal conclusions about Mexico's compliance with the
NAAEC. The penultimate paragraph states that
102. It is possible to suggest that the NAAEC and the CEC were not intended to be solely
responsible for taking up the slack with respect to the adverse environmental effects of liberal-
ized trade. Other institutions, such as the Border Environment Cooperation Commission, the
North American Development Bank, the International Boundaries and Waters Commission
(IBWC), Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico, Treaty Respecting Utiliza-
tion of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., 59. Stat.
1219 (Feb. 3, 1944), and US-Mexico bilateral cooperative programs with respect to the border
arising from the La Paz agreement, Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Im-
provement of the Environment in the Border Area, U.S.-Mex., 35 U.S.T. 2916 (Aug 14, 1983),
were designed to work together with it. Yet, the corollary of a comprehensive program that
relies on a number of border and tri-national institutions to address the environmental conse-
quences of liberalized trade is that such a comprehensive program must be effective. Here, it
means that the entities should have worked together to remediate the wastes at Metales. Espe-
cially given the peculiar role of the submission process in signaling failures of national envi-
ronmental regulation and management, even if by itself it could not possibly be expected to do
everything, it is not unreasonable to expect that it should have triggered actions by those other
institutions. None of that has happened.
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[w]ithout aiming to reach conclusions of law on whether Mexico is
failing to enforce LGEEPA Article 170 [the provision allowing the
government to impose sanctions on violators] ... effectively, the in-
formation presented by the Secretariat in this factual record reveals
that, as a matter of fact, the site abandoned by Metales y Derivados is
a case of soil contamination by hazardous waste in relation to which
measures taken to date have not prevented the dispersal of pollutants
or prevented access to the site, which relates to the issue of whether
Mexico is effectively enforcing LGEEPA Article 170.103
The disclaimer is consistent with prevailing interpretations of Arti-
cles 14 and 15. Factual records are to include only finding of fact and are
not to draw legal conclusions. 10 4
Two problems arise from this limitation. First, strict focus of the
submission process on the allegation of fact in the submissions provides
no legal determination of Mexico's compliance with NAAEC obliga-
tions, in particular its obligations under Article 5. While the petitioner's
factual assertions were vindicated virtually in their entirety, their legal
significance remains unclear. 10
5
Mexico failed to vigorously prosecute the case against New Frontier
and to seek extradition of Kahn, as conscientious U.S. staff attorneys in
the EPA and Department of Justice would be expected to do. Yet, does
Mexico's lax criminal enforcement amount to a failure of effective envi-
ronmental enforcement? The question is not academic. After all, the
NAAEC acknowledges certain excuses or justifications for nonenforce-
ment. It specifically excepts those situations where government officials
have engaged in "a reasonable exercise of their discretion in respect to
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or compliance matters" or "bona
fide decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in respect of other en-
vironmental matters determined to have higher priorities." 10 6
As an explanation of its failure to pursue Kahn and New Frontier as
vigorously as community activists had desired, Mexican officials cited
limited resources to monitor, investigate, and prosecute maquiladora
plants. In 1993, two lawyers had to handle 800 ongoing proceedings.
Mexican authorities may have determined that their scarce resources
were best employed in probing other cases, where the environmental im-
103. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 59-60. Cf id., Comments of the United
States of America, attachment 3, at 154.
104. North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Citizen Submissions
on Enforcement Matters: Submissions Guidelines, Council Res. 99-06, art. 12 (June 28, 1999),
available at http://www.cec.org/citizen/guide-submit/index.cfm?varlan=english [hereinafter
Submissions Guidelines]; see also Markell, Commission, supra note 47 (discussing the citizen
submission process).
105. Cf Markell & Knox, supra note 89, at 87.
106. NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 45(1).
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pacts perhaps seemed to be more severe and the need for a remedy more
urgent. The implication is that the Mexican government made a legiti-
mate and unavoidable judgment call about the appropriate allocation of
legal and investigative resources. Vigorous prosecution of Kahn lost out
at this decision point.
This explanation, however satisfactory on the surface, misses a lar-
ger, systemic defect in the allocation and availability of regulatory re-
sources to Mexican environmental officials. This issue is not new; it has
been the subject of international criticism by the OECD and the World
Bank. 107 As the factual record points out, "between August 1996 and
March 2000, a total of 210 new maquiladoras were built in Tijuana, or an
average of one per week, while in that same period the number of inspec-
tors and other personnel of the PROFEPA State Office in Tijuana re-
mained essentially the same." 10 8 In 2003, there were more than 1,300
maquiladora plants in the Mexican state of Baja California, 10 9 with most
of the plants concentrated along the San Diego-Tijuana border area. The
total number of maquiladoras for that year in the six Mexican states that
border the United States was in excess of 3,300.110
At the same time, the activities of PROFEPA and real government
spending on environmental protection have languished. Total spending
on environmental protection activities increased several fold during the
NAFTA negotiations and the period immediately preceding the agree-
ment's entry into force. Since then, it has dropped steadily, from a high
in 1994 to about fifty-five percent of that amount in 1998.111 Similarly,
107. See Gallagher, supra note 97, at 121 (citing Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, Mexico: Environmental Performance Review (1998); World Bank, Mexico:
A Comprehensive Development Agenda (2001)).
108. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 43-44.
109. Based upon information gathered by Cristina Lopez from Mexican government
sources. Sistema de Informaci6n Empresarial Mexicano, (June 22, 2003) at
http://www.siem.gob.mx/portalsiem.
110. Id. The six Mexican border states are Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila,
Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas. In 1996, forty-four percent of all maquiladora employment was lo-
cated in the three border cities of Juarez (across from El Paso, TX), Tijuana, and Matamoros
(across from Brownsville, TX). See also Ian MacLachlan & Adrian Guillermo Aguilar, Ma-
quiladora Myths: Locational and Structural Change in Mexico's Export Manufacturing Indus-
try, 50 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 315 (1998). The total number of maquiladora plants in Mexico
numbered about 4,300 in June 2003, based upon information gathered by Cristina Lopez from
Mexican government sources. Sistema de Informaci6n Empresarial Mexicano, at
http://www.siem.gob.mx/portalsiem, up from approximately 2,200 in 1994. Id. GARY C.
HUFBAUER ET AL., NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SEVEN YEARS LATER 41 (2000).
111. See Gallagher, supra note 97, at 123; see also Response of the Administration of
George Bush to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a North American Free
Trade Agreement (May 1, 1991), reprinted in NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCESS 165 (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995) [hereinafter Response of the Administration]
(budget of Mexican environmental agency "increased almost eight-fold between 1989 and
1991 (from $5 million to $39 million)"). Barbara Hogenboom, however, suggests that these
numbers may well have been inflated. See HOGENBOOM, supra note 87, at 234.
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plant-level environmental inspections went up about fivefold during
1993, the final year of negotiation of NAFTA, but they have steadily de-
creased since then. 112 From a high of more than 15,000 environmental
inspections a year in 1993, inspections dropped to about half that number
in 2002.113
A similar trend can be observed with respect to inspection person-
nel. Until 1991, Mexico had only 109 environmental inspectors to police
the entire country. 1 14 In anticipation of a World Bank loan that year,
Mexico added fifty inspectors at the U.S. border and fifty in Mexico
City. 115 In 1992, the total number of environmental inspectors at the
border increased to 200, four times the number employed there in
1989.116 But by 1993, even though Mexico reported that it had "a total
of 460 inspectors countrywide," the number at the U.S.-Mexico border
area had dropped to 130 inspectors. 117 The attrition in the border area
from 1993 to 2002 roughly paralleled the drop in the total number of en-
vironmental inspections in that same period
Barbara Hogenboom has also suggested that the sheer numbers of
inspectors gives a more positive impression of inspection and enforce-
ment activities than is justified. She has pointed to three serious prob-
lems:
First, despite the remarkable expansion of inspecting staff, their
number was still insufficient. Most inspections took place in large
companies and the most polluting industrial sectors, leaving many
companies uninspected. 118 Second, there were problems with con-
tracts, salaries and payment of inspectors, which enhanced corrup-
tion. In November 1991, for instance, it was reported that SEDUE
had cut 48 per cent of its inspection personnel. Of the border inspec-
tors only about one-fifth worked as full-time government employees,
while the rest worked under contract, and many of them had to wait
months to receive their salaries. Third, most inspectors were still
112. See Gallagher, supra note 97, at 122. Gallagher also points out that inspections
peaked in 1993 at only 6 percent of all firms in the country. Id. at 122.
113. Compare id. at 122 (more than 15,000 inspections in 1993) with information gathered
by Cristina Lopez from the PROFEPA Web site, http://www.profepa.gob.mx/seccion.aspsec
_id=213&itit=494&comid=0 (last visited June 23, 2003) (7,619 inspections in 2002) (in-
formation also on file with author).
114. See International Activities Division of the United States EPA, Evaluation of Mex-
ico's Environmental Laws and Regulations-Interim Report of EPA Findings (Nov. 22, 1991),
reprinted in NAFTA AND THE ENvIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 186 (Daniel Ma-
graw ed., 1995).
115. See Response of the Administration, supra note 111, at 163, 165, 170.
116. Report of the Administration on NAFTA, supra note 96, at 239, 249-50, 260.
117. The NAFTA: Report, supra note 97, at 452.
118. It is often suggested that "many smaller firms are more pollution intensive." See Gal-
lagher, supra note 97, at 124; see also HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 110, at 53-54.
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badly trained, while those that were well-trained were soon offered a
better contract in the private sector. 119
A conservative estimate is that in the early 1990s, when Mexico is-
sued the criminal indictment against Kahn and when the maquiladora in-
dustry was already in full swing, the number of plants in the San Diego-
Tijuana border area should already have numbered upwards of 500. To
allocate only two lawyers and six inspectors and other staff to monitor,
inspect, and pursue enforcement actions for this region, as the Metales
factual record sets out, seems woefully inadequate. Given the obvious
and foreseeable environmental regulatory oversight needs of a booming
industrial area, and considering the tax revenue streams that these plants
were generating for the Mexican government, the failure to allocate more
resources to regulatory oversight and enforcement suggests willful ne-
glect of potential environmental concerns. 120
If a conscious allocation of regulatory and enforcement resources of
this type qualifies as a legitimate exercise of enforcement discretion or as
the bona fide allocation of enforcement resources, the NAAEC's effec-
tive enforcement obligation will have little meaning. Undoubtedly, the
situation has improved over the years. 121 Whether past or present en-
forcement levels are adequate, however, is the very question that the fac-
tual record left unanswered. Without legal conclusions, the Mexican
government can continue to maintain not only that there has been no
breach of its obligations under the NAAEC but also that it is hardly to
blame for the problems at the Metales site. No definitive resolution of
the critical assertions by the submitters-that there has been a breach of
NAAEC obligations-and the rebuttal by Mexico-that its actions were
authorized under the exceptions set out within the NAAEC itself-is
possible. Attempts to pressure or shame Mexico into more active en-
gagement in environmental regulation and enforcement are deprived of
significant force. After all, according to Mexico's position, it did noth-
ing wrong and therefore has nothing to be ashamed of.
The second problem arising out of the failure to articulate legal con-
clusions is that more formal response measures are unlikely to be initi-
ated. Factual records that evidence a persistent failure by one party to
119. HOGENBOOM, supra note 87, at 235 (citations omitted).
120. This also seems to suggest that expectation that NAFTA's "obligations regarding ef-
fective enforcement [would] help to guarantee Mexico's continued progress in the develop-
ment of its environmental enforcement program" were misplaced. The NAFTA: Report, supra
note 97, at 393.
121. See id. Nevertheless, Hogenboom also questions whether the improvements have
resulted in actual progress of industrial compliance with regulatory requirements.
HOGENBOOM, supra note 87, at 236-37. She notes that Mexican officials estimate that "more
than 90 percent of Mexican industry did not comply with the ecological norms for manage-
ment of contaminated residuals" in 1993. Id. at 237.
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effectively enforce its environmental laws may lead another party to trig-
ger the NAAEC's formal Part V bilateral consultation and dispute set-
tlement processes. Such consequences form the logical link between the
monitoring function of the submission process and the substantive reme-
dies, formal sanctions, for the treaty breach. 122
In the Metales case, the acknowledged understaffing and underre-
sourcing of enforcement offices arguably constitutes a pattern of persis-
tent enforcement failures. If enforcement resources are inadequate, en-
forcement failures are bound to be persistent and give rise to a pattern of
failures to intervene. Nevertheless, neither the United States nor Canada
has initiated a Part V action.
Over the ten-year existence of the CEC, despite the numerous sub-
missions filed in that time, Part V processes have never been triggered.
Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, it is unlikely ever to hap-
pen based on the public choice dynamics of the process. The failure of
factual records to draw legal conclusions exacerbates such difficulties.
Narrow substantive scope. The second problem of the factual re-
cord's scope arises out of its narrow substantive view of relevant gov-
ernment actions. The resulting picture of what led to the enforcement
failure is narrow and incomplete.
As David Markell has elaborated, much of that trend has emerged
since November 2001,123 when the CEC issued a set of resolutions au-
thorizing preparation of records in five submissions. 124 According to
Markell, the CEC Council changed, substantially limited, or redefined
"the scope of the factual records to be developed" from the submitters'
focus and the Secretariat's recommendation:
While the submitters asserted that broad, programmatic failures to ef-
fectively enforce particular environmental laws exist[ed], and while
122. Lack of effective environmental enforcement would result in a de facto lowering of
environmental standards compared to jurisdictions with similar standards but more stringent
enforcement policies. A NAAEC party that persistently fails to effectively enforce its envi-
ronmental laws would put businesses in its jurisdiction at a competitive advantage over busi-
nesses elsewhere and capture attendant economic benefits. Accordingly, NAAEC parties that
become aware of a pattern of effective enforcement failures could be expected to resist such
unfair regulatory and enforcement tactics by initiating Part V bilateral consultation and dispute
settlement processes.
123. See John D. Wirth, Perspectives on the Joint Public Advisory Committee, in
GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION 199, 207 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003); David L. Markell,
The CEC Citizen Submission Process: On or Off Course?, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH
AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 274, 275-80 (David L.
Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) [hereinafter Markell, CEC Citizen Submission Process].
124. North American Council for Environmental Cooperation, Council Res. 01-08 to 01-
12 (Nov. 16, 2001), at http://www.cec.org/who-we.are/council/resolutions/index.cftn?varlan =
english&year=2001.
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the Secretariat recommended that these asserted widespread failures
to effectively enforce be investigated through development of factual
records, the Council resolutions decline[d] to direct the Secretariat to
develop factual records on such broad, programmatic alleged failures
to effectively enforce. 12 5
The Metales submissions, including the Council resolution authoriz-
ing the factual record, predate these developments. Nevertheless, the
trends are evident in two respects even in the Metales factual record: (1)
the exclusion of issues related to the extradition efforts on Kahn and (2)
U.S. enforcement failures.
First, the submitters requested the development of a factual record
with respect to Mexico's failure not only to vigorously pursue Metales
and Kahn for the regulatory violations but also to seek his extradition
once Kahn had fled its jurisdiction. The CEC excluded the second issue.
The Commission's main justification was the allegedly inadvertent
legislative repeal of the underlying substantive environmental provi-
sion. 12 6 The action was in keeping with its prior decisions not to develop
factual records of submissions where the alleged effective enforcement
failures were due to legislative repeals of the underlying substantive en-
vironmental law. 12 7 Their obvious importance to the Mexican govern-
ment's overall handling of the matter was deemed irrelevant.
Second, the factual record's primary focus on Mexican enforcement
failures suggested that all the substantive blame lay with Mexico. The
United States was allowed to escape virtually all accountability, even
though much of the Metales waste originally came from across the bor-
der. However, to the extent that U.S. and California officials allowed the
export of the wastes when they might have prevented it, responsibility
must be shared.
The Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office did bring a
criminal indictment against Jose Kahn and New Frontier in 1992, result-
ing in a guilty plea, a $50,000 fine, and probation conditions that re-
quired various environmental remedial actions at the Metales site. Un-
fortunately, the most significant condition, repatriation of the wastes to
the United States, was never fulfilled. Given that Kahn's exploits in-
volved the crossing of an international boundary and the dumping of
wastes that are usually regulated by the EPA, why were Kahn and New
125. Markell, CEC Citizen Submission Process, supra note 123, at 276-77.
126. Metales Factual Record, supra note 1, at 14 n.2, 15-16.
127. See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Citizen Submis-
sions on Enforcement Matters: Spotted Owl (Sept. 21, 1995), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/95-1-DET-E1.PDF (discussing Secretariat Determination
under Article 14(2)).
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Frontier not stopped sooner? Why were they never the subject of an
EPA federal enforcement action?
One response is that a federal enforcement action might not have
been viable. 128 It has been commonly accepted that the wastes came
from the United States; however, specific evidence has been scarce.
129
Moreover, information about the recycling operation at Metales has not
been publicly available. How Metales processed the used batteries and
other lead wastes, its financial viability, and its environmental practices
would have been relevant to the bona fide nature of recycling at Metales.
Although the export of hazardous wastes is subject to a notification
scheme under Annex III of the La Paz Agreement, 130 materials destined
for recycling operations are generally not considered hazardous waste. 1
31
Proof that Metales y Derivados was not a bona fide recycling operation
would have been critical to a successful enforcement case. 132
The 1992 California indictment suggests there was at least enough
to justify a prosecution under that state's environmental laws. 133 Never-
theless, Kahn's guilty plea in the state proceeding has prevented the pub-
lic airing of the evidence against Kahn, and an independent assessment
of the strength of a federal environmental enforcement action against him
is not easy to make.
The prosecutorial justifications for not moving forward with a fed-
eral enforcement action against Kahn do not in themselves, however, jus-
tify ignoring the issue in the submission process. The very purpose of a
factual record is to probe not only the factual basis of the submitter's al-
legations but also the factual basis and reasoning behind the actions and
inactions of the party concerned. 134 Documentation of the contamination
at the site, and the events that led to the contamination, is crucial to a
thorough assessment of the Mexican government's failure to vigorously
128. Interview with John Rothman, Regional Counsel's office, EPA Region IX (Mar. 4,
2004).
129. Information about the total quantity of wastes shipped by New Frontier and Kahn to
Metales from the United States would also have been relevant, but quite difficult to come by.
Since such information would be a measure of the environmental harm, it could have influ-
enced any potential penalty size.
130. Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment
in the Border Area, Nov. 12, 1986, U.S.-Mex., art. III, 26 I.L.M. 16, 25 [hereinafter Annex III
to La Paz Agreement]. In the absence of the Annex III, section 3017 of RCRA would have
required similar notification to the importing country. 42 U.S.C. 6938(g) (2004).
131. See Lisa T. Belenky, Cradle to Border: U.S. Hazardous Waste Export Regulations
and International Law, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 95 (1999).
132. Moreover, since EPA's RCRA regulations contain a specific exemption for the recy-
cling of lead acid batteries, the kind that were also found at Metales, an enforcement action
would have to look to the more difficult-to-trace lead slag as the primary evidence. 40 C.F.R.
266.80 (2004); 40 C.F.R. 261.6(a)(iv) (2004); see also Belenky, supra note 131, at 105-06.
133. Litigation discovery proceedings might have revealed more information.
134. See, e.g., Submissions Guidelines, supra note 104, art. 12(l)(b).
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prosecute Kahn and New Frontier. The lack of such factual findings
with respect to the original battery and lead waste shipments to Metales
effectively prevents any questioning of the enforcement decisions by the
U.S. government. The public is deprived of an opportunity to examine
for itself the persuasiveness of the underlying reasoning.
Could an assessment of U.S. actions have been appropriately in-
cluded in the Metales record? The EHC, in its citizen submission to the
CEC, failed to incorporate explicit allegations that the United States
failed to effectively enforce its environmental laws. 135 Nevertheless, the
Secretariat could have investigated these issues on its own initiative. The
charge of the Council with respect to the development and scope of the
factual record would not, on its face, have foreclosed such an inquiry. 136
Moreover, investigation of U.S. enforcement would have made efficient
use of Commission resources because it might avert a second duplicative
submission focusing specifically on the United States.
A substantive objection to the inclusion of an assessment of U.S.
enforcement arises from the NAAEC's explicit affirmation of the princi-
ple of territorial sovereignty. Insistence that each party to the NAAEC
be solely responsible for the enforcement of the laws within its own terri-
tory, including environmental laws, is arguably an extension of the sov-
ereignty principle. Hence, allegations of an enforcement failure by one
party should, by this reasoning, lead to investigations of the actions and
inactions of that particular subject government.
The premise, however, that it is possible to assess the effectiveness
of a nation's environmental enforcement efforts in the abstract, and in
isolation from the actions of other states, is faulty. In a case of alleged
transboundary misconduct, as arises in the international trade in hazard-
ous waste, the failure to bring enforcement actions in the country of ori-
gin can make the job of law enforcement authorities in the country of
destination that much harder. In fact, that has been the very premise of
U.S. drug enforcement authorities' complaints about inadequate interdic-
135. There are reasons of structural bias why a submitter might want to limit the target of
their submission to a single party rather than to seek a more broadly inclusive factual record.
Given that the development of a factual record requires the affirmative support of at least two
of the three NAAEC parties, expanding a submission to a second party could increase the
likely influence of self-interested behavior on Council decision-making. Id. at art. 15(2).
Unlike a submission targeting one party, when two disinterested parties can over-ride the sub-
mission target's negative vote, a submission targeting two parties might result in the two target
states blocking the development of a factual record.
136. North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Citizen Submissions
on Enforcement Matters: Metales y Derivados, Council Res. 00-03 (May 16, 2000), available
at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-7-Res -en.pdf; North American Commission for Envi-
ronmental Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters: Metales y Derivados,
Overall Workplan for Factual Record 1 (May 30, 2000), available at
http://www.cec..org/files/pdf/sem/98-7-dev-e.pdf ("relevant facts that existed prior to 1 Janu-
ary 1994, may be included in the factual record").
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tion activities in other countries, including Mexico. Such examples sug-
gest that judgments about fault and the normative and legal responsibility
for failures to engage in effective environmental enforcement efforts
cannot be made without reference to the actions of others. 13 7
Here, the causes of the Metales situation cannot be fully understood
without examining the actions and mutual expectations of both countries.
For example, Annex III to the La Paz Agreement explicitly acknowl-
edges the necessity for bilateral efforts and imposes reciprocal obliga-
tions to control trade in hazardous wastes. 138 Failure to cooperate would
undermine each nation's individual efforts. If Mexico reasonably relied
on U.S. commitments under the La Paz Agreement, failure to enforce
U.S. environmental laws ought to be viewed as contributing to enforce-
ment failures on the Mexican side of the border, possibly by overwhelm-
ing the resources of enforcement authorities there. The actions or inac-
tions of the United States would thus be relevant to the problems at
Metales and an appropriate area of inquiry for a factual record.
Unfortunately, the Metales factual record lacks such pertinent in-
formation. It falls considerably short of achieving the transparency that
is the overall goal of the submission process. 139 The complete context
necessary to fairly allocate responsibility and to select appropriate reme-
dies, including what U.S. officials could do to prevent a recurrence of
these problems, is not available. 140 It is, therefore, questionable whether
the process is capable of achieving even the narrow goal of improving
the enforcement of national environmental laws.
3. The Failure to Broaden Environmental Governance
It is also questionable whether the submission process has achieved
a third goal of transparency: the broadening of environmental govern-
ance to allow more people, especially those directly affected by regula-
tory policies, to participate in decision making. 14 1
137. For example, there are well-established legal principles, such as in tort law, suggest-
ing that legal responsibility of one actor is not necessarily vitiated by the intervening actions of
another, especially when such intervening actions were reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Mar-
shall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604 (lst Cir. 1955); Sears v. Morrison, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528 (Cal.
App. 3 Dist. 1999) (rescuers foreseeable).
138. See Annex III to La Paz Agreement, art. II, § 2 ("[E]ach Party shall ensure, to the ex-
tent practicable, that its domestic laws and regulations are enforced with respect to trans-
boundary shipments of hazardous waste and hazardous substances .... ).
139. From a macroscopic, systemic perspective, it provides no contextualized account of
how regulatory and enforcement policies can have transboundary effects.
140. For example, it might also have been appropriate to examine the effectiveness of
HAZTRAKS, a bi-lateral tracking system for hazardous waste, as well as the operation of the
La Paz Agreement.
141. But see Donald McRae, Trade and the Environment: The Issue of Transparency, in
GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
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The submission process is clearly an important advance. 142 Private
individuals may trigger the submission process, which in turn may lead
to a factual record. 143 The public may also provide information to the
Secretariat during the preparation of the factual record. 144 While the in-
formation that citizens submit need not be incorporated in the factual re-
cord, the Secretariat is likely to do so in the interest of accuracy and
completeness. In the Metales matter, the information-gathering process
by the Secretariat was wide-ranging and included requests for informa-
tion from many private entities as well as governmental agencies. 145
Yet a modicum of improvement in public participation does not
equal success for the submission process. Success and effectiveness
must also be judged by reference to expectations created during the
adoption of the NAAEC. For example, in congressional testimony extol-
ling the NAAEC's benefit, EPA Administrator Carol Browner stated that
"NAFTA and the [NAAEC] side agreement... embrace public partici-
pation .... There is real opportunity for public involvement. 146
The submission process has fallen far short in this regard. Expecta-
tions about significant opportunities for public participation have gener-
ally not been met. 147 Neither the public nor the submitters have any
right to shape the factual record with respect to its scope or its findings.
Nobody has a right to participate in the decision to authorize develop-
ment of a factual record; it is entirely within the discretion of the Coun-
cil. 148 In the event that the Secretariat determines that development of a
COOPERATION 237, 249 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003). McRae sees the
"concept of transparency [as] related to access to information and participation in the proc-
esses of environmental decision-making, and it is linked to the role played by nontraditional
international actors." Id. at 238-39. McRae includes in the concept: "1) the opportunity to
initiate processes that will lead to decision-making or.that will contribute to ensuring compli-
ance with environmental standards; 2) access to information; 3) the opportunity to contribute
information to an environmental decision-making process; 4) participating in forums in which
decision-makers consider information and hear arguments; and 5) participating in the making
of the actual decision that has an environmental impact." Id. at 239.
142. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 86, at 267.
143. NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 14(1).
144. Id. at art. 15(4).
145. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 77, 89 apps. 4, 6.
146. Environmental Implications, supra note 96, at 15-16 (statement of Carol Browner,
Administrator, EPA).
147. Another measure of success might also be reference to the present levels of public
participation in other environmental agreements (virtually none) or the opportunity costs-
what other, more effective measures could have been incorporated. The submission process is
a clear advance over existing public participation mechanisms in other agreements. But there
is a question as to whether continued public NAFTA opposition, especially in light of what the
public and environmental community now knows about the submission process, might not
have resulted in a mechanism that assured greater public input. Cf Markell, CEC Citizen
Submission Process, supra note 123, at 274-88.
148. NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 15(2); Submissions Guidelines, supra note 104, at art.
10.1. Neither the terms of the NAAEC themselves nor the citizen submissions Guidelines ap-
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factual record is not warranted, or if the Council disagrees with the Se-
cretariat's recommendation to develop a factual record, no formal appeal
or process for reconsideration is available. State parties may review the
draft of the factual record and comment on its accuracy before a final
version is submitted to the Council; the public does not. 149 Finally, the
contents of the factual records are secret until they are released to the
public by decision of the Council.
The result is a report that has not been scrutinized and has not oth-
erwise benefited from public input other than in the barest essentials.
The public is largely shut out. The factual underpinning of the implicit
legal and policy conclusions have been shaped only by the Secretariat
and the NAAEC party governments. 150 In fact, if certain interests and
concerns of the public are not shared or represented by the Secretariat
and government officials, they are not likely to be reflected in the factual
record.
The substantive consequences of these limitations are apparent in
the Commission's decisions to exclude the extradition issue from the
Metales factual record. Even though the submitters disagreed with the
CEC's decision about the factual record's scope, there was no means to
express this formally. After all, the contents of the factual record were
secret until the Council had approved it for publication.
The most troubling implications of the public's lack of involvement
in these key decision points, however, only become apparent when the
justification for excluding the extradition issue is carefully examined.
The sole articulated reason was Mexico's say-so. 151 The factual record
contains no other justification. There is no discussion of why such an in-
advertent legislative enactment should have the asserted retroactive ef-
fect, no explanation of why the Mexican government's position is correct
as a matter of Mexican law or why Mexico's assertion should be authori-
tative. Nor is there any reference to relevant judicial determinations. In
essence, the public and the submission's originators are required to ac-
proved by the Council provide any criteria guiding such decisions. However, the Submissions
Guidelines also suggest that the Council will provide the public with its reasons for instructing
the Secretariat to develop a factual record or not. Id.
149. NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 15(5).
150. For example, as Donald McRae has pointed out, "a determination of admissibility, a
determination of whether to request a response from the Party concerned, and a determination
to recommend to the Council that a factual report be prepared all involve potential issues of the
interpretation of the NAAEC." McRae, supra note 141, at 248.
151. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 14 n.2. Furthermore, even though the opera-
tive environmental provision might have been repealed in 1996, as asserted by the Mexican
government, there is no question that the same provision was legally effective prior to that
time, including the entire time period when Jose Kahn and Metales were the subject of the
various notices of violations and when the original arrest warrant was issued.
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cept the assertion's validity on faith, without having any opportunity to
challenge it. 152
To its credit, the CEC's factual record did question Mexico's as-
serted legal interpretation of a separate statutory claim in the submis-
sion. 153 Although the factual record did not assert that Mexico's inter-
pretation of that other issue was actually incorrect, Canada forcefully
stated that "[ilt is not appropriate nor consistent with the spirit of the
NAAEC for the Secretariat to challenge the interpretation a Party gives
of its domestic legislation." 154 The need to maintain the independence of
the fact-finding process and the self-serving nature of Mexico's legal in-
terpretation were of little concern.
The extradition issue also illustrates another means by which the
party subject of a submission can reduce or avoid public participation
and thus limit its accountability: 155 designation of certain information as
152. In this respect, the CEC's decision in the Spotted Owl submission, SEM-95-001,
where no factual record was developed on a limited legislative repeal (the "Recissions Act"),
is inapposite. See Markell, Commission, supra note 47, at 554-55; Kal Raustiala, Interna-
tional "Enforcement of Enforcement" Under the North American Agreement on Environ-
mental Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 721, 725-26 (1996). There, even the submission's
originators agreed that legislative action prevented enforcement of the relevant environmental
statute. Petition Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, Spotted Owl Submission, SEM-95-001 (June 30, 1995) (petition from Biodiver-
sity Legal Foundation et al. to the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/95-l-SUB-EO.pdf (last visited November
14, 2004). Thus, while the submission's originators may have disagreed with the CEC about
the legal implications of the Recissions Act with respect to the United States' obligations to
"effectively enforce" its environmental laws, there was no disagreement about the Recissions
Acts' domestic legal consequences in preventing enforcement under US law. In Metales,
however, the legal consequences under domestic Mexican law of the asserted legislative repeal
was never aired and examined publicly because the claim itself was kept secret for such a long
time.
153. With respect to the enforcement authority set out under section 170 of the LGEEPA,
Mexico maintained that the statutory language granting enforcement power to its environ-
mental officials was completely discretionary in nature. It pointed to the use of the word
"may" in LGEEPA Article 170 rather than "shall." Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at
50. The Commission disagreed. While "[n]o specific judicial interpretation of LGEEPA Arti-
cle 170" nor "of the word 'may' in the context of environmental law" more generally exists,
the factual record pointed out that the Mexican government's simplistic interpretation was in-
consistent with Mexican judicial interpretations of the word in the area of taxation. Id. at 50.
Thus
[t]hese courts have established that the word "may" is not to be interpreted in a
purely grammatical sense, but that rather, its interpretation on the nature of the pow-
ers invested in the authority. They have indicated that discretionary powers shall
not be confused with the use of judgment. Along the same lines, another case law
criterion indicates that the powers of the authority must be interpreted with refer-
ence to the express purpose that the norm seeks to achieve.
Id. at 50-51 (citations to Mexican cases omitted).
154. Id. at 149, attachment 2.
155. Another tool, less readily applied, is delay or failure to cooperate in the preparation
and publication of the factual record. While the target party is required to advise the Secre-
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confidential. 156 By doing so, the Mexican government prevented public
dissemination of its response for more than two years. 157 It was not until
three months before release of the draft factual record to the NAAEC
parties, and five months before completion of the final factual record,
that the public had access to Mexico's response, including its argument
that the extradition issue was not a proper subject of the factual re-
cord. 158
The upshot is that even if the public was eventually apprised of the
substantive contents, Mexico's assertions remained unchallenged for two
years. The delay seriously prejudiced the ability of the submission's
originators and others to respond and to provide countering perspectives.
Designations of confidentiality not only protect information from
public disclosure; they can also effectively impede the use of that infor-
mation in the development of the factual record. They allow a party to
shield its justifications, explanations, and excuses for enforcement fail-
ures from public scrutiny and challenge. In the end, delay and confiden-
tiality designations can blunt or even avoid the embarrassment and
shame that development of a factual record might create.
A careful examination of Metales shows that the success of the citi-
zen submission process and published factual records must be viewed
with circumspection. Their ability to achieve the primary goal of trans-
parency-that is, the revelation of specific events, circumstances, and
processes that occurred during environmental enforcement proceed-
ings-is clear. Nevertheless, the Metales matter suggests that they have
not necessarily led to greater accountability with respect to the achieve-
ment of the ultimate substantive goals of transparency: (1) substantive
improvement or remediation of the environment, (2) enhanced environ-
mental enforcement efforts, and (3) broad public participation in envi-
ronmental governance. The design of the citizen submission process has
left many opportunities for the parties to subvert and compromise its ef-
fective operation.
tariat within sixty days as to whether the subject matter of the submission is also the subject
matter of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding and is invited to provide any other
relevant information, it is required to submit no other information. See NAAEC, supra note 1,
at art. 14(3). In effect, the failure of a target party to cooperate in the factual investigation can
vastly complicate or delay the development of the factual record.
156. See id. at art. 39(2); Submissions Guidelines, supra note 104, at art. 17(2), (4).
157. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 9 n. 1. Mexico's response was kept confi-
dential from the time it was submitted to the CEC on June 1, 1999 to June 28, 2001. This was
not the first time Mexico took this step. See Knox, supra note 6, at 89.
158. The Secretariat completed its draft factual record on October 1, 2001, with the com-
ments by the NAAEC parties incorporated into the final factual record and submitted to the
Council on November 29, 2001. Approval for public release came only on February 7, 2002.
Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 143-50 attachments 1-2; Markell, CEC Citizen Sub-
mission Process, supra note 123, 291 app. A.
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE FAILURES OF THE METALES MATTER
The Metales case demonstrates that the citizen submission process
has managed to increase regulatory enforcement transparency without
accomplishing the underlying triple goal of improved environmental
quality, enhanced enforcement, and broadened environmental govern-
ance. To those who held out hope that the process would address the ex-
pected environmental ills of NAFTA, its failures are surprising and dis-
heartening.
A close inquiry into the nature of international institutions, includ-
ing the dynamics of treaty enforcement and the political accountability of
international organizations, the political economy of the border region,
and the operation of markets and social norms, suggests that these out-
comes should have been expected. First, the nature of international insti-
tutions and the international legal system creates difficulties in enforcing
environmental treaties as well as ensuring the political accountability of
such institutions to particular individuals and communities. Second, the
political economy of the U.S.-Mexico border region and the marginaliza-
tion of the communities living there are an inherent obstacle to the effec-
tive functioning of governmental and regulatory processes. Third, the
operation of markets and social norms is not conducive to promoting
voluntary compliance in situations such as Metales.
A. The Nature of International Institutions
The nature of the NAAEC as an international organization, and of
the citizen submissions as an international process, presents two chal-
lenges. First, the submission process is a weak device to coerce a party's
compliance with the obligation "to effectively enforce its environmental
laws and regulations through appropriate government actions." 159 Sec-
ond, the Secretariat and the Council members are largely insulated from
political accountability for their actions with respect to the submission
process.
1. The Difficulties of Enforcing the NAAEC
The difficulties of promoting compliance with the effective en-
forcement requirement, or of inducing substantive environmental reme-
dial efforts, are attributable to the weak coercive action of transparency
and to the public choice of enforcement.
159. NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 5(1).
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a. Citizen Submissions as a Mechanism to Monitor and
Induce Compliance
For U.S. environmental lawyers, it is tempting to compare the sub-
mission process to the citizen suit provisions contained in many U.S. en-
vironmental statutes. Like citizen suit provisions generally, the NAAEC
submission process grants private individuals a role in instances where
the government has failed to bring appropriate environmental enforce-
ment action. Private individuals are empowered through the submission
process to take the government to task for its enforcement failures.
That is where the analogy ends. Unlike U.S. citizen suits, submis-
sions to the CEC cannot in themselves result in substantive remedies,
whether they be penalties, environmental remedial orders, or other types
of injunctive relief. A factual record is the only successful outcome. 160
Moreover, the submission process does not anticipate the submitters' ac-
tive participation in the fact-finding process. Once a submission has
been filed, the process is entirely controlled and managed by the Secre-
tariat and the Council. 161
Accordingly, the submission process has more appropriately been
described as a complaint-based monitoring system 162 or likened to a fire
alarm triggering an investigation into a party's compliance with treaty
obligations. 163 Its functions serve primarily to alert NAAEC parties and
the Secretariat to instances of noncompliance rather than to enforce the
obligations of the NAAEC.
Nevertheless, characterizing the submission process solely as a
mechanism to generate information about the parties' national environ-
mental enforcement behavior and policies would not fully capture its
utility. Submissions clearly have the potential to do more than that.
Submissions and published factual records can serve as informal means
of inducing compliance. Public exposure of noncompliance may result
in disapproval by the public and may shame responsible officials into
compliance.
It may also trigger other responses. Private individuals may organ-
ize informal private boycotts, bring formal legal actions under domestic
law, or even seek to hold public officials accountable through electoral
politics. Other states may use noncompliance information to pressure re-
sponsible officials through diplomatic means, threaten formal or informal
punitive measures, or withdraw or block international cooperative en-
deavors. Information about noncompliance generated by the submission
160. See id. at art. 14-15; Knox, supra note 6, at 84-85.
161. SeeNAAEC, supranote 1, atart. 14-15.
162. See Knox, supra note 6, at 11.
163. Raustiala, supra note 86, at 267.
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and the factual record is in all instances a prerequisite and justification
for such negative responses.
The submission process is an integral component of efforts to sanc-
tion or otherwise induce compliance. Unfortunately, the unremediated
lead and heavy-metal wastes at the Metales site and inaction in Kahn's
prosecution demonstrate that even if transparency is a necessary condi-
tion, it is not in itself sufficient.
b. The Weak Coercive Force of Transparency Alone
The most obvious explanation for these difficulties is the weak co-
ercive power of transparency. 164 Disapproval and shame may erode a
state's national and international standing and an individual official's
personal reputation. 165 They will be less able to command respect and
influence among their peers. Their promises and assertions may become
less credible, and their participation and cooperation in international in-
stitutions may become less desired by others. These consequences, how-
ever, are usually indirect and subtle. Rarely are immediate and signifi-
cant effects directly attributable to public disapproval and shame.
Exposure of misdeeds may also trigger fear of other potential ad-
verse responses, be they formal or informal. But such fear is unlikely to
be great unless the risk of adverse consequences is significant. If the de-
terrent value of punitive responses is small and does not outweigh the
benefits of the misdeed, changes in behavior by governments and gov-
ernment officials will typically not occur.
The Metales case confirms these expectations. Ever since the resi-
dents of Colonia Chilpancingo were first affected by the pollution ema-
nating from Metales, protests at the facility and requests for government
action have abounded. After the EHC filed the citizen submission in
1998, the matter also began to garner attention in the U.S. national media
through stories on National Public Radio and in the Wall Street Journal,
Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post.166 A 1999 conference on en-
vironmental justice at the U.S.-Mexico border, cosponsored by the EPA
164. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock & John E. Thorson, Coordinating Land and Water Use in
the San Pedro River Basin, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 231 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003).
165. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,
90 CAL. L. REv. 1823 (2002) (proposing theory that states are concerned about the reputa-
tional and direct sanctions that follow violation of international law).
166. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 21, 1998); Marc Lif-
sher, Groups Use NAFTA in Move To Clean Up Border Plant, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1998, at
CA1; Ken Ellingwood, California and the West: Mexico Accused of Failure to Clean Up Plant
Environment: Groups on Both Sides of Border Hope NAFTA Agreement Will Lead to Removal
of Lead Slag and Debris Near Homes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at A3; Kevin Sullivan, A
Toxic Legacy on the Mexican Border, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at A 17.
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and the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, drew the at-
tention of the Mexican environmental agency PROFEPA, as well as U.S.
state and local officials, to the problems at Metales. 167 The EPA and
Mexican government officials have repeatedly met on the Metales mat-
ter, going as far as to discuss site cleanup options and the associated
costs. Politicians, labor unions, and faith-based organizations have also
visited the site.
PROFEPA covered up the wastes with plastic tarps, repaired some
fencing, and installed warning signs. In recent years, members of the
Mexican parliament have also publicly expressed support for legislation
creating a cleanup fund, similar to the U.S. Superfund, for abandoned
hazardous-waste sites. Concrete legislative action, however, has not yet
been taken. Nor has public exposure resulted in any substantive gov-
ernmental remediation.
Colonia residents also requested intervention by the EPA. But since
the site is situated outside the United States, the EPA's formal response
has been that Superfund monies are unavailable. In a turnaround, how-
ever, EPA agreed at the end of February 2004 to provide $85,000 for
planning of an eventual cleanup and for stabilization of the wastes at the
site. 168  While the contribution is encouraging, it will not be nearly
enough to cover the most rudimentary remediation option.
c. The Public Choice of Enforcement
Transparency and exposure of noncompliance can also trigger for-
mal, strong coercive responses by other state parties, such as the NAAEC
Part V dispute settlement process. Availability of such processes, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean they will be applied when noncompli-
ance occurs.
There are three general obstacles. 169 First, deterrent sanctions are
public goods. 170 Their application raises problems of collective action
167. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, BORDER
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REPORT (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resou
rces/publications/ej/nejac-ej-border-report.pdf (last visited January 5, 2005).
168. Sandra Dibble, EPA Grant to Help Otay Revive Abandoned Smelting Operation, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 27, 2004, at B3; personal conversation with John Rothman, Re-
gional Counsel's office, EPA Region IX (Mar. 4, 2004).
169. Tseming Yang, International Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good: The Role of In-
stitutional Deterrent Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements (unpublished
manuscript).
170. See generally DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994);
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
(Vol. 76
HeinOnline  -- 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 480 2005
METALES Y DERIVADOS
and strategic behavior. 171 The harm to the environment from one party's
noncompliance with the terms of an international environmental treaty is
borne by all other treaty parties. Oftentimes, the costs for any one party
to respond to noncompliance by imposing sanctions are much greater
than the marginal hassle to each individual treaty party. 172 For example,
application of deterrent sanctions such as trade embargoes entails direct
costs in the form of lost trade with the noncompliant party, as well as in-
direct costs if the noncompliant party retaliates. 173 The cost-benefit cal-
culus typically will not favor an enforcement action, so the probability
that any one party will individually and independently initiate such ac-
tion and impose sanctions is small.
At the same time, collective responses, which can distribute the
costs of sanctions among several parties to the treaty, may be stymied by
free-rider problems. Parties that do not join in the sanctions response
also do not share in the costs. Nevertheless, if the violating party comes
into compliance, they will benefit from any positive outcome, including
improved environmental quality. Thus, it is within each party's narrow
self-interest to shirk its responsibility. 174 Unless states can be coerced or
otherwise induced to participate, collective mechanisms are unlikely to
be an effective response to noncompliance. 175
Second, this situation presents a classic second-order collective ac-
tion problem. 176 It usually arises in the context of a primary collective
action problem, here the protection of the environmental commons that
the treaty system is designed to address in the first instance. Because the
problem of enforcement is embedded within the treaty, it is second order
in nature. The problem of imposing deterrent sanctions does not arise
until after a treaty breach has occurred-that is until after the solution to
the primary collective action problem has failed. Because deterrent sanc-
tions usually cannot be created and "stored" in advance and in anticipa-
tion of their need, the collective action problem also cannot be resolved
before a breach occurs. In other words, it cannot be solved by first-order
action.
171. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 352-53 (1997).
172. This is the converse of the situation Garrett Hardin described in The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
173. See MARGARET P. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 26-27, 100-02, 106-09 (1987); see also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION 37, 183 (1984).
174. See DOXEY, supra note 173, at 106-09.
175. There are some mitigating dynamics, such as iteration and long-term relationships.
See, e.g., AXELROD, supra note 173, at 187-89; BAIRD ET AL., supra note 170, at 159-87.
176. See AXELROD, supra note 173, at 28-29; see also James D. Fearon, Bargaining, En-
forcement, and International Cooperation, 52 INT'L. ORG. 269 (1998).
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Third, many of the benefits of treaty enforcement-such as the
strengthening of the rule of law, the reinforcement of norms of conduct,
and the promotion of voluntary compliance-are difficult to value or are
incommensurable. 177 In environmental treaties, difficulties in quantify-
ing environmental harms compound these problems. Disagreements
over the value to be measured (aesthetic pleasure, environmental services
provided by ecological systems) and the methodology of measurement
(such as contingent valuation) abound even within the U.S. environ-
mental regulatory system. 178 Perspectives that assign noneconomic val-
ues to nature, as do proponents of animal rights, environmental ethics, or
cultural values in the environment, further complicate such inquiries. In
the absence of a consensus about values and the criteria for measuring
them, an adequate analysis of, much less agreement on, the need for en-
forcement will be elusive. Such obstacles are likely to result in an un-
dervaluation of enforcement and, in turn, underenforcement of treaty ob-
ligations.
The failure of the United States and Canada, individually or jointly,
to trigger Part V bilateral dispute settlement processes is consistent with
the public choice of enforcement. Neither state has a vital interest in
pursuing such a process, even though the allocation of inadequate re-
sources to environmental enforcement efforts in the U.S.-Mexico border
region seems to be systemic and to provide maquiladora industries with a
competitive advantage over their United States or Canadian counter-
parts. 179 The potential harm to bilateral relations with Mexico and the
real risk of retaliation prevail over the amorphous benefits of enforce-
ment. 18 0
The difficulties are exacerbated by the high legal standard that trig-
gers a Part V proceeding: a state's persistent failure to effectively en-
force its environmental law. (By contrast, any failure of effective en-
forcement is sufficient to trigger a factual record.) In the absence of an
actual Part V dispute settlement proceeding addressing Mexico's maqui-
ladora enforcement policies in the border region, it is impossible to ade-
quately evaluate Mexico's potential liability. The heightened standard
creates uncertainty about the likelihood of success even with a clear fac-
tual record. The incentive to initiate a Part V dispute settlement process
177. See ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-22
(1981); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalization
in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 141 (2002).
178. See, e.g., Ohio v. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
179. John Wirth has suggested that Canada's reluctance is explained by fears that the Part
V process might be used against that nation in the future. See Wirth, supra note 123, at 205.
Mexican concerns about the submission process may also be driven by the risk of disclosure of
proprietary information and business secrets during the process. Id.
180. See Knox, supra note 6, at 59.
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is likewise diminished. In the end, the public choice of treaty enforce-
ment impedes the effectiveness of transparency in promoting adherence
to the NAAEC's duty of effective environmental enforcement. The out-
comes in the Metales matter confirm these concerns.
2. The Accountability of International Organizations to
Individuals and Communities
Who should be held accountable for the failures of national en-
forcement and the inability of the CEC submission process to induce the
Mexican and U.S. governments to meaningfully address the problems at
the Metales site? The national governments clearly must bear primary
responsibility. But what about the CEC? Metales was a direct result of
the trade liberalization efforts that created the maquiladora industry. The
NAAEC was designed to be one of the primary responses to such envi-
ronmental problems. Since the CEC submission process, triggered when
a party fails to comply, has a quasi-supervisory role in national environ-
mental enforcement, shouldn't the CEC share in the blame?
Holding the Commission accountable for Metales is in many re-
spects akin to placing ultimate responsibility in an attorney general or
district attorney for the prosecutorial decisions of their deputies. But the
comparison is problematic, at best. Suggesting that the Commission has
a supervisory role over national environmental enforcement officials in-
correctly implies that it can take significant action independent of the
party states and that it has authority over them. The reality is the reverse.
The Commission is ultimately governed by the party states (through the
Council). It cannot initiate any significant sanctions procedure on its
own. Nor can it appeal to a higher authority other than the party states
themselves. The Commission could even be terminated if the parties
jointly chose to do so. 181
Like most international organizations, the CEC is a creature of the
states that created it. It is thereby subject to the control of and politically
accountable to the NAAEC party states. Individuals and small commu-
nities like Colonia Chilpancingo usually play no significant role.
The lack of accountability of international institutions is hardly a
surprise to international lawyers. The structures of these institutions re-
flect international law's bias against individuals. The prevailing notion
that international law gives rise to rights and duties primarily between
181. Cf Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submis-
sions Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 141, 178-83 (2002) (describing ongoing
actions by the Parties and the Council in limiting the discretion and control of the Secretariat).
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states still largely holds true. 182 The situation is not fundamentally dif-
ferent within the NAAEC. Even though private individuals may petition
the Commission to generate a factual record, their role in and control
over the process is minor. They are adjuncts to party states, not primary
stakeholders within the process. 183
Like administrative agencies, international organizations may ulti-
mately be accountable through the national governments and political
leaders that control them. Thus, the Commission is arguably responsible
to the political constituencies of the three NAAEC parties through the
Council's supervision. 184  However, experience with administrative
agencies in the United States suggests that, in practice, such control and
accountability is quite limited. Those practical limitations apply to the
Council's control of the Commission as well.
Direct supervision of international organizations is also limited and
fractured. The NAAEC provisions limit the powers of the Council with
respect to the Commission. The Council's tripartite nature further im-
poses collective decision-making requirements that insulate the CEC
from true political accountability to the party states themselves.
That assessment, however, begs the ultimate question of account-
ability. The NAAEC parties are, by virtue of representation on the CEC
Council, a part of the Commission itself. And the most important powers
within the NAAEC-to initiate Part V dispute settlement processes and
to make the factual record public-are reserved to the party states and
Council. The Secretariat has no direct role in their exercise.
It appears, then, that the submission process failed the residents of
Colonia Chilpancingo not because of the Commission's lack of account-
ability. Rather, Metales is evidence of a lack of commitment or resolve
by the national governments to force a resolution of these issues. As the
entities that ultimately control the Commission, the party states have re-
fused, or have lacked the political will, to make the submission process
work. It is their joint activities-or, rather, their lack of concerted ac-
tion-that make the Commission generally unresponsive to communities
such as Colonia Chilpancingo.
182. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 636-39 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955);
see also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1088-93 (1992); James Cameron & Ruth Mackenzie, Access to Envi-
ronmental Justice and Procedural Rights in International Institutions, in HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 129-52 (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. Ander-
son eds., 1996). One of the notable exceptions is international human rights law.
183. See infra Part II(B)(3) on lack of citizen control over and participation in process.
184. That circumstance does not provide the Commission with unchecked power to do as
it pleases. Most of the tasks that are not subject to the Council's direct control are technical,
administrative, or otherwise noncontroversial. Moreover, even when there is no direct ability
to influence Commission activities, control may ultimately be exerted through the appointment
of Commission staff.
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B. The Political Economy of the Border Region
The difficulties of holding party states and the Commission itself
accountable through the structures of the NAAEC do not fully explain
the problems at Metales. Why did the Mexican and U.S. governments
not proceed more vigorously against Jose Kahn and New Frontier Trad-
ing in the first instance, and why have the heavy-metal wastes at Metales
languished for almost a decade? The citizen submission process was in-
tended to be triggered only when national governments have failed to en-
force their environmental laws. The question thus becomes why the en-
forcement failures of the United States and Mexico occurred in the first
place.
One place to look for an explanation is the political economy of the
border region and of environmental regulation, both within Mexico and
the United States. Border communities like Colonia Chilpancingo are
poor and economically marginalized. As is true for most of those on the
lower economic rungs of society, their lack of economic clout goes hand
in hand with their political disenfranchisement. Economic trends in
Mexico in recent decades, including the shrinking significance of labor
unions, have contributed as well. 185
Exacerbating these trends is the Mexican government's great degree
of centralization, 186 a political system that has been described by some as
authoritarian. 187 Most government policy and regulatory decisions are
made in the capital, Mexico City. Border communities are far away from
decision-makers not only physically but also in terms of social and eco-
nomic distance. Substantive opportunities for public participation in
governmental decisions are generally lacking. 188 Because environmental
policy has long been a low priority for Mexico, 189 regulatory failures are
common. The socioeconomic marginalization of border towns results in
correspondingly little political attention being paid to their concerns by
public officials. 190
185. See, e.g., HOGENBOOM, supra note 87.
186. See, e.g., Christopher N. Behre, Mexican Environmental Law: Enforcement and Pub-
lic Participation Since the Signing of NAFTA 's Environmental Cooperation Agreement, 12 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 327, 329-30 (2003).
187. See HOGENBOOM, supra note 87, at 59; Williams, supra note 9, at 796.
188. See U.S. EPA, Evaluation of Mexico's Environmental Laws and Regulations-
Interim Report of EPA Findings, (Nov. 22, 1991), reprinted in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 195-96 (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995); see also U.S. EPA, Evaluation
of Mexico's Environmental Laws, Regulations, and Standards (Nov. 5, 1993), reprinted in
NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 598 (Daniel Magraw ed., 1995).
189. See HOGENBOOM, supra note 87, at 61-109.
190. Similar complaints have been raised by residents living on the northern side of the
border region with respect to regulatory attention by the United States. See, e.g., Williams,
supra note 9, at 797-806.
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What about the responsibility of U.S. regulatory authorities for
Metales? Much of the waste shipped to Metales for recycling came from
the United States. Ordinarily, such shipments are subject to state and
federal environmental regulations. And, of course, New Frontier Trading
was a U.S. entity and its owner, Jose Kahn, a U.S. citizen. If U.S. regu-
lators had not allowed Kahn and New Frontier to export wastes from the
United States and instead had taken steps to ensure their proper disposal
before they became a problem at the site, the contamination would never
have occurred.
Some things did happen. Kahn was indicted and pled guilty to two
counts of transporting hazardous wastes in contravention of California's
state environmental laws. 191 The EPA, however, took no substantive en-
forcement action. The legal rationale for the lack of U.S. intervention to
prevent or curtail the contamination at Metales is fairly simple. The
residents of Colonia Chilpancingo were not U.S. citizens, and the facility
itself was located wholly outside the United States. Since federal envi-
ronmental laws are generally presumed not to apply beyond U.S. bor-
ders, 192 their protections did not extend to Mexican communities. Thus,
U.S. officials appeared to have no direct legal responsibility for Metales.
Such views, sincerely held and reflecting the reality and limits of
agency powers, are shortsighted and, especially for policy makers, disin-
genuous. Laws, regulations, and public policy can be changed. The op-
erative question is why such changes have not happened and why the
United States has not used other avenues, including discretionary powers
or diplomatic channels, to intervene.
Just as with the Mexican authorities, the underlying reasons for in-
action or delay are all too clear. As noncitizens, the residents of Colonia
Chilpancingo are not even part of the political body to which U.S. offi-
cials are accountable. Similar to the complaints of environmental justice
activists in the United States and in many communities made up of the
poor and people of color, their status as political outsiders puts them last
in line to have U.S. officials take their interests seriously.
That truth becomes apparent when the economic dynamic of the
Metales recycling operation is examined. Since the recycled lead and
copper were reimported to the United States by New Frontier, Metales
essentially allowed the extemalization of waste and pollution by-
products of the recycling process to the Mexican side of the border re-
191. The EPA itself did not move forward with an enforcement action against Kahn
largely because of uncertainties as to the origins of the wastes Kahn shipped and the applica-
bility of recycling exemptions under RCRA regulations to Kahn's activities. Interview with
John Rothman, Regional Counsel's Office, EPA Region IX (Mar. 4, 2004).
192. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244 (1991). See also Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
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gion. 193 The simple reality is that principles of pollution prevention and
internalization of pollution costs, highly valued by U.S. environmental
regulators, do not always reach beyond the U.S. border.
The most troubling aspect of nonenforcement, however, is Mexico's
failure to pursue Kahn once the Mexican criminal indictment had been
issued and after Kahn abandoned Metales. Mexico had already initiated
a criminal enforcement proceeding. Kahn's response was to flee the ju-
risdiction.
The Mexican government should have had an especially strong in-
terest in extradition so as to counteract the appearance that Mexican laws
can be flouted with impunity. Binational work groups, including one on
enforcement cooperation formed under the U.S-Mexico Border XXI
Program and its subsequent incarnations, stood ready to assist. More-
over, Kahn's prosecution by the Los Angeles County District Attorney's
Office left little doubt that prosecutors knew Kahn's whereabouts.
Mexico's official explanation for its lackadaisical extradition efforts
was the implied legislative repeal of the underlying legal provision in
December 1996.194 However, that still leaves the question of why the
Mexican authorities did not seek extradition soon after they filed the in-
dictment in May 1993 or after the arrest warrant was issued in September
1995.195
A less self-serving explanation for Mexico's dilatory response can
be found in the context of U.S.-Mexico border relations. With illegal
immigration and the illegal drug trade dominating not just regional but
also national politics and public attention, environmental crimes, even
those involving a contaminated facility left behind by a U.S. maquiladora
operator, may simply appear much less significant. 196
A third possibility is that Mexico has been concerned about the
long-term chilling effect of a criminal prosecution on foreign investors,
especially other maquiladora operators. 197 Any effort to pursue Kahn
across the international border would send a signal not only to polluters
that Mexican authorities are clamping down on violations of environ-
193. See, e.g., Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An Environmental Justice
Critique of Free Trade, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 979 (2001); Tseming Yang, International Envi-
ronmental Protection: Human Rights and the North-South Divide, in JUSTICE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 87 (Kathryn M. Mutz et al. eds.,
2002).
194. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 14 n.2.
195. Metales Factual Record, supra note 7, at 131, tbl., "Summary of Actions by Mexican
Authorities with Respect to Metales y Derivados."
196. Cf HOGENBOOM, supra note 87, at 61-62.
197. See, e.g.., Mary E. Kelly & Cyrus Reed, The CEC's Trade and Environment Pro-
gram: Cutting-Edge Analysis but Untapped Potential, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH
AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 103 (David L. Markell & John
H. Knox eds., 2003); Williams, supra note 9, at 787-90.
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mental laws and regulations, but also to other maquiladora operators that
they might become targets of prosecution. Given that other developing
countries in East Asia and South America have been energetically com-
peting with Mexico for U.S. investment capital and manufacturing jobs,
robust enforcement might severely hamper Mexico's ability to attract
foreign investors.
The last explanation is troubling. 198 To refrain from enforcement in
order to attract industry and investment amounts to effectively lowering
environmental standards for reasons of economic competitiveness. It is
the specter of the race to the bottom that NAFTA advocates sought to
dispel with the adoption of the NAAEC.
The most insidious consequence, however, arises from the unfortu-
nate fact that Jose Kahn's willful violations of Mexican environmental
laws were open and notorious. Just as a determined enforcement action
against Kahn might have sent the "wrong" message to foreign investors,
the failure of the Mexican and U.S. governments to pursue Kahn and to
clean up the facility has conveyed a converse message to border commu-
nities, maquiladora operators, and the public: that the Mexican govern-
ment does not take violations of environmental laws seriously and that
the United States will keep quiet as long as the environmental problems
stay outside its borders.
If the political economy of the border region was unique, the
Metales matter could be dismissed as a symptom of the problems of a
special region of the world. Unfortunately, Metales-type issues occur not
only south of the U.S.-Mexico border. Poor and minority communities
north of the border and elsewhere in the United States have complained
for years of regulatory neglect by the EPA and state environmental offi-
cials. 199 The basic complaints about such environmental injustices as
regulatory neglect, marginalization, and disenfranchisement are the
same. Such communities receive scant governmental attention and are
often disparately affected by pollution and environmental degradation.
The political and economic dynamics that are at the core of the
Metales problem also appear in many developing countries. The pres-
sures of poverty and joblessness that drive industrial development and
198. For a view that environmental concerns constitute a special interest that should not
stand in the way of trade liberalization, see Javier Mancera, A Mexican View on Trade and En-
vironment, in CAROLYN L. DEERE & DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE AMERICAS: NAFTA'S
LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERE TRADE 31-38 (2002).
199. See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide
in Environmental Law, A Special Investigation, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2;
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS (Robert D. Bul-
lard ed., 1993); UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF
COLOR (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE
GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT (2000).
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trade liberalization lead to uncontrolled development, increased pollu-
tion, and risks to the public health of local populations. While the most
common sources are local polluters, the importation of the industrialized
nations' hazardous wastes, ostensibly for recycling, has become a main-
stay of the economies of countries such as Nigeria, India, and China. But
the Metales debacle occurred virtually in America's own backyard and,
with the public attention generated by media reports and the citizen sub-
mission process, its consequences cannot be ignored.
C. The Operation of Markets and Social Norms
The third issue that must be considered for a full understanding of
the environmental problems at Metales is the operation of markets and
social norms. The coercive force of social norms and institutions on in-
dividual and corporate behavior is not as strong as traditional deterrent
sanctions. Nevertheless, their influence can be significant, especially
when legal deterrent sanctions are not available.
Markets and social norms can provide incentives and disincentives
for behavior in the same way as legal sanctions and government subsi-
dies. Markets open opportunities for profit or loss. Social norms set the
stage for social approbation or disapproval that can affect a person's or
company's standing and reputation in the community. Such responses to
the tragedy of the commons are much more informal and flexible than
official actions.20 0 However, their effect can be the same. For example,
Carol Rose has shown that in the absence of legal rules, custom can be
an effective mechanism to regulate access to common resources. 20 1
Robert Ellickson has written about the effectiveness of social norms, as
expressed by peer pressure and social expectations, in reducing overgraz-
ing on open-access pastures.202 In societies and cultures without formal
and well-developed systems of law, social institutions, including cultural
and religious taboos, step in to supply the operative rules for access to
common resources.
203
Market-based inducements to behavioral change are sometimes the
most effective means of reaching corporate actors, because they influ-
200. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North, eds., 1990).
201. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986).
202. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
203. See e.g., Johan Colding & Carl Folke, The Taboo System: Lessons about Informal
Institutions for Nature Management, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 413 (2000); Martin S.
Weinstein, Pieces of The Puzzle: Solutions For Community-Based Fisheries Management
From Native Canadians, Japanese Cooperatives, And Common Property Researchers, 12
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 379 (2000).
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ence the bottom line. Advocates of free-market approaches to environ-
mental problems typically propose to change business behavior by subsi-
dies and taxation. For example, tax breaks may encourage the develop-
ment and use of energy-efficient or alternative-energy technologies, and
discourage pollution and waste creation.20 4
Government does not have a monopoly on the use of markets to in-
fluence environmental behavior. Market strategies are available to civil
society as well. Consumer boycotts and public campaigns to change pri-
vate purchasing preferences have exerted strong pressure on industry to
change its behavior. More recently, a movement to educate consumers
to make socially and environmentally conscious choices has increased
demand and expanded markets for such commodities as "fair trade" cof-
fee and energy-efficient hybrid cars. Business leaders, meanwhile, have
learned that a reputation among consumers as an environmental bad actor
can hurt the bottom line, whereas a positive environmental image can
drive sales. 20 5 Social norms and public pressure can also be credited for
the growth of voluntary codes of conduct and other voluntary business
measures designed to lessen pollution and environmental degradation.
Why did social institutions and market pressures fail to prevent the
poor environmental practices at Metales and dissuade Kahn from aban-
doning the facility rather than clean it up? First, poverty, the very condi-
tion that has marginalized Colonia residents socially and politically, also
marginalizes them as an economic force. As a group with little eco-
nomic power, their ability to use the market to punish or reward polluters
and bad environmental actors is extremely limited.20 6
The likelihood of success in recruiting support for a boycott from
other communities or other businesses was slim. In spite of media re-
ports, the plight of communities such as Colonia Chilpancingo is largely
unknown outside of the border region. Their economic and social mar-
ginalization puts a distance between them and most communities in the
United States that makes it that much harder to generate feelings of soli-
darity and to obtain support. Moreover, the physical remoteness of
Mexican border communities from most U.S. population centers makes
their problems seem less real than the ones most Americans encounter
daily in their own neighborhoods.
204. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental Regulation, in 2
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 6 (1997).
205. In some other human rights and social justice contexts, such as boycotts of South Af-
rica to protest apartheid, the magnitude of consumer sentiments mobilized has been even more
significant.
206. Moreover, any economic influence Colonia residents do possess would have had
minimal influence on Kahn because Metales and New Frontier sold their products mainly to
other businesses, not to individual consumers.
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Another obstacle to generating broad public support in the United
States is the perception of Mexico as a third-world country with exten-
sive poverty, poor health conditions, and widespread despair. The image
leaves most in the United States with the sense that Metales is nothing
out of the ordinary. 207 It might even appear to Americans as a benign
sign of economic development and a necessary cost of job creation. Af-
ter all, the U.S. response to third-world poverty and joblessness has been
to encourage foreign investment and development of export manufactur-
ing industries. The benefits that U.S. companies reap from cheap labor
and weak regulatory structures go unspoken, while wastes are left behind
and the cost of living for workers soars.20 8 In effect, subconscious big-
otry and selfishness facilitates purposeful disregard of such issues.
The same social dynamics have also made the exercise of social
pressure and social norms less likely to work on Kahn and those associ-
ated with the Metales operation. Like an absentee landlord, Kahn oper-
ated his business in a community in which he did not live. He was not
subject to the social disapproval and pressures of the surrounding
neighborhood that might have induced him to act more responsibly. The
community in which he does live, San Diego, has little direct stake in the
pollution at Metales. And with the international border separating his
residence from Tijuana, Kahn is not even subject to the pressures of a
common national society that might have sought to induce responsible
action through other means. 20 9
As much as the political economy of the border region is the result
of the relationship between an industrialized and a developing country,
the failure of markets and social institutions is connected to the same dy-
namics. Joblessness and the economic development needs of developing
countries create opportunities for international trade and investment. But
they also weaken the ability to bargain for and affect the distributional
balance of pollution and environmental degradation that go along with
foreign investment and a higher gross domestic product. Poverty, geo-
207. Cf Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J. GENDER RACE
&JUST. 1, 16 (1997).
208. See, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, Voices from the Barbed Wires of Despair: Women in the
Maquiladoras, Latina Critical Legal Theory, and Gender at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 729, 768-69 (2000); ROBERT MANNING, FIVE YEARS AFTER NAFTA:
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 7 & note 7 (Cen-
ter for Immigration Studies 2000). In the border region, a higher cost of living has left real
wages largely stagnant since the adoption of NAFTA in 1994. See Tim Weiner, Free Trade
Accord at Age 10: The Growing Pains are Clear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2003 at Al & chart.
In fact, between 1993 and 1998 real wages in the maquiladora manufacturing industry dropped
from US$1.77 an hour to US$1.56 an hour. See MANNING, supra, at 9-10 & tbl. 4 (2000).
209. There is no evidence that Kahn was a member of a trade association that might have
subjected his business operations to association standards. In other words, it does not appear
that Kahn was subject to peer pressure to act more responsibly or to operate Metales according
to generally accepted business practices.
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graphical distance, and cultural differences widen the gulf between the
perceptions, expectations, and sensibilities of members of wealthy indus-
trialized societies and their poorer cousins. The result is that the bonds
of empathy, community, and shared sense of destiny that might instill a
desire to act altruistically, or at least to look beyond one's narrow self-
interest, are weakened and less able to compel assistance. Here, the fail-
ures of markets and social institutions to positively affect the behavior of
New Frontier and Kahn precipitated the irresponsible operations at
Metales.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE LESSONS OF METALES: LOOKING FORWARD
The Metales matter has brought to light pervasive structural prob-
lems of international environmental agreements, like the NAAEC, that
stymie their enforcement. Fashioning practicable long-term solutions re-
quires an honest assessment of the constraints under which international
organizations operate, the political disconnect between government
agencies and marginalized populations such as the poor and people of
color, and the obstacles that block social institutions and markets from
effectively deterring environmental misconduct.
I propose two sets of reforms. One set consists of specific recom-
mendations for changing the citizen submission process. 210 Even if such
reforms are politically infeasible, the proposal remains relevant to ongo-
ing negotiations to expand NAFTA to the rest of the Americas. In par-
ticular, the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas have led
to demands for an environmental side agreement similar to the
NAAEC. 211
The other proposal is to create a binational environmental special-
purpose district that would complement the reformed citizen submission
process with a substantive environmental enforcement arm. Such a dis-
trict would resemble many existing environmental special governmental
entities, such as regional air quality districts under the federal Clean Air
Act and the International Boundaries and Waters Commission that oper-
ates in the U.S.-Mexico border region. A critical difference, however, is
that I propose that the new district have an elected governing commis-
sion. I elaborate on the organization, rationale, and feasibility of these
two proposals below.
210. Some of my suggestions parallel those of others. See, e.g., Block, supra note 3, at
540-42.
211. The Central American Free Trade Agreement already incorporates a citizen submis-
sion process in its final text.
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A. Improving Process: Reforming the Citizen Submission Process to
Promote Accountability
I propose four structural reforms of the citizen submission process:
(1) formalizing and opening up the process for developing and finalizing
the factual record to promote more citizen input and participation, (2)
expanding the process's mandate to include the preparation of legal con-
clusions, (3) making the submission process largely autonomous from
Council control, and (4) allowing private citizens to trigger the Part V
dispute settlement process with respect to persistent enforcement fail-
ures. The first three reforms improve transparency by expanding the
number of people involved in shaping the information-gathering process,
the type of information generated, and the authority of the Secretariat.
They judicialize the submission process. The fourth shifts power away
from states toward nonstate actors. All of these changes would require
amendment of the NAAEC.
1. Formalizing and Opening up the Factual Record
Development Process
While private individuals can, at present, trigger the development of
a factual record and may provide information to the Commission for in-
clusion in the document, they are largely excluded from actively shaping
the record's scope and content. In particular, the public does not have a
formal role in the review of the draft factual record, as the parties to the
NAAEC do. Nor does the public have a right of access to the factual re-
cord and the parties' submissions. For example, Mexico was able to
keep its response to the Metales submission secret until just a few
months before the draft factual record was completed. The remedy
would be to require that all submissions and responses to the Commis-
sion be made public unless the Council, by majority vote, expressly im-
poses secrecy for articulated exigent circumstances.
Three characteristics of this reform step make it particularly attrac-
tive. First, formalizing and opening up the factual record development
process to greater public participation would make the process more ad-
versarial. The submitters and the responding party could, and likely
would, more vigorously comment on and dispute each other's positions
and assertions than they do at present. Such a robust exchange of views
would improve the final factual record's accuracy and completeness.
Second, formalization and greater openness would enhance the process's
legitimacy. Finally, no additional resources would need to be expended
to implement the reform.
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2. Preparing Legal Conclusions
The NAAEC calls on the submission process to generate a factual
record. That mandate has been interpreted to mean that the Commission
should not draw legal conclusions from the facts it finds. Without such a
legal evaluation, the submission process is seriously hampered in its abil-
ity to promote accountability by national governments. The subject party
of the factual record can simply deny noncompliance with the NAAEC,
by pointing, for instance, to excusing conditions unevaluated by the
Commission. A submission process with an expanded mandate could
help prevent a party from misleading others about its compliance record,
as well as reduce ambiguity and disputes about the meaning of the effec-
tive enforcement requirement.2 12
Expanding the submission process mandate to include legal conclu-
sions would require few additional resources and thus should present few
serious difficulties. At present, the Commission staff investigating and
preparing factual records consists of lawyers by training, and their profi-
ciency in legal analysis should be of little doubt. Furthermore, the ability
of parties to review and comment on draft factual records, combined with
greater openness of the submission process, ought to alleviate concerns
about errors and misinterpretation of laws.
3. Making the Citizen Submission Process and Factual Record
Development Semi-Autonomous
Even though the Council and the party states have no formal and
specific role in preparing the factual record, the Council retains the right
to influence the record's development at two key points: the approval to
prepare a factual record at all and the decision to release the factual re-
cord to the general public. 213 The Council can either prevent the investi-
gation from going forward altogether or prevent the public release of its
result. While it has never taken the latter step, the Council has refused
on several occasions to allow the investigative and factual record devel-
opment process to go forward with little or no explanation. 214 Decreased
transparency has been the outcome.
The remedy is to turn over such decisions to the Secretariat or the
staff involved in the submission process, thereby creating a semi-
212. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 79, at 22-26. Authoritative legal interpretation
of treaty obligations can educate potential violators about treaty requirements, inform parties
about their own levels of compliance, and allow parties to correct or avoid inadvertent non-
compliance. ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 543-44.
213. See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 9; see also Knox, supra note 6, at 89-90.
214. See, e.g., Commission for Environmental Cooperation, SEM 98-005 (Aug. 11, 1998),
SEM 98-007 (Oct. 23, 1998), SEM 01-001 (Dec. 10, 2002).
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autonomous unit within the Secretariat. Even if the Commission had the
ultimate power to deny official adoption of a factual record or some other
review power, the usefulness of the factual record development process
would not be significantly reduced. As long as the process is fully public
and is brought to a conclusion on its own merits, an unadopted but accu-
rate and persuasive public factual record could promote the goals of
transparency.
Creating a semi-autonomous process would not be a radical move.
Federal agencies in the United States have semi-autonomous administra-
tive adjudicative processes. EPA's own administrative law judges and
the Environmental Appeals Board are relevant examples. 215 The head of
the agency retains the ultimate power to overrule the decisions of the in-
ternal administrative process. However, in instances where overruling a
carefully prepared and persuasive opinion would be seen as an act of po-
litical manipulation, the agency head would do so at her own political
peril.
Independence would reduce the impact on the submission process
of politically motivated or self-interested decisions by the parties. Just as
important, however, it would also promote decision making based on
principle and rules.
4. Allowing Private Individuals to Initiate the Dispute
Settlement Process under Part V of the NAAEC
Presently, only state parties may initiate dispute settlement proceed-
ings under Part V of the NAAEC. To ensure that the anticipated conse-
quences of transparency translate into better environmental management
and enforcement, private individuals ought to have standing to initiate
such proceedings. Although this may seem to be the most radical of the
four proposed reforms, it falls well within precedent established in U.S.
domestic environmental laws and under NAFTA's Chapter 11.216
There are some significant implementation issues. What remedy
should a successful Part V proceeding grant a private individual? How
215. See, e.g., Nancy B. Firestone, The Environmental Protection Agency's Environmental
Appeals Board, I ENVTL. LAW 1 (1994). Such a process would have precedent in the investor
protection provisions of NAFTA's Chapter 11, under which the independent arbitration proc-
ess may result in an award of damages.
216. NAFTA Chapter 11 grants foreign investors from a NAFTA country protection from
the host state with respect to ensuring national treatment, most favored nation treatment,
minimum international standards, and performance requirements prohibitions. NAFTA §§
1102, 1103, 1105, 1106. In addition, it allows an aggrieved investor to initiate a dispute set-
tlement process against the host nation. In at least one instance, it has already resulted in an
arbitral award against Mexico because environmental regulatory actions impaired the chapter
11 rights of a U.S. investor. See generally HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1202-1225 (2d ed.).
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should such a decree be executed? An award of millions, even hundreds
of millions, of dollars may be the appropriate outcome of an arbitration
between states, but for private individuals it might well be a windfall out
of all proportion to the direct harm they suffered. Moreover, where pri-
vate individuals are seeking environmental remediation-injunctive re-
lief to force a party to clean up a waste dump or change its waste dis-
posal practices-a damage award, no matter how great, might be useless.
To the extent that outsized awards are meant as punitive damages, grant-
ing them to private individuals may not be effective in coercing compli-
ance. Whereas state parties can enforce their Part V awards by imposing
trade sanctions, no such power is available to private individuals.
These problems are not insurmountable. One might imagine vari-
ous processes by which individuals could enforce their Part V awards in
national courts, just as they would any other arbitration award.217 Part V
awards could also be treated as U.S. environmental citizen suit penalties
are: as payments due to the treasuries of the various NAAEC parties. 218
To the extent other party states have been materially harmed by en-
forcement failures, it might be fair and just for those state coffers to re-
ceive a portion of the award. Another possibility is to pay the awards
into a special fund administered by the CEC. Such monies could be used
to address the environmental and public-health harms caused by en-
forcement failures. Such a special fund may be the preferred solution,
because it would advance the mission of the NAAEC to provide a sub-
stantive response to the negative environmental and public-health im-
pacts of NAFTA.
Giving private individuals standing to initiate Part V proceedings is
arguably the most controversial of the four proposed reforms. It has the
potential for imposing financial liability on a party beyond what it agreed
when it signed the NAAEC and NAFTA. Nevertheless, there is prece-
dent for such individual standing in NAFTA's Chapter 11 provisions.
Whether any of these proposals are adopted will depend not just on the
political will of the NAAEC party states but also the amount of public
dissatisfaction and political pressure exerted on them to amend the
NAAEC.
B. What About Substance? Imagining a Border Environmental
Quality District
Reform of the NAAEC citizen submission process to enforce the
obligations of party states will address only one set of causes of the
217. In fact, that is the assessment enforcement mechanism specified for Canada.
NAAEC, supra note 1, at annex 36A.
218. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998).
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Metales problems. Sound management of the border environment will
require the setting and implementation of adequate substantive environ-
mental standards, the creation of mechanisms to hold officials account-
able for success or failure in achieving environmental goals, and the
grant of specialized powers to address transboundary pollution and en-
forcement issues. These substantive concerns cannot easily be integrated
into the CEC's existing mandate and mission.
Hence, I propose the creation of a U.S.-Mexico border environ-
mental quality district ("BEQD"). The BEQD would have a geographic
jurisdiction coextensive with the 100-kilometer border zone established
under the La Paz Agreement. 219 Its charge would be to address envi-
ronmental and public-health issues within its jurisdiction. The BEQD
would be administered by a board of commissioners elected by border-
zone residents. Its work, like that of other local environmental govern-
mental organizations, would have to be coordinated with that of EPA and
other U.S. agencies with environmental missions as well as the Mexican
environmental ministries. As a binational regional government focused
specifically on environmental and public-health issues at the border, it
would also have the power to tax and raise revenues to fund its mis-
sion.220
The BEQD might be controversial in the United States because it
would grant governmental power, including taxing power, to a commis-
sion not solely controlled by U.S. nationals. Like many of the submis-
sion process reform proposals, however, the concept and rationale for the
BEQD is not novel. Environmental special-purpose districts have wide-
spread and long-standing antecedents in U.S. law. For example, regional
air quality districts created to implement the mandates of the federal
Clean Air Act are a form of regional government endowed with regula-
tory power to address environmental issues. Nor is the concept of an
agency with transboundary jurisdiction anything new. Binational or-
ganizations such as the U.S.-Mexico International Boundary and Water
Commission ("IBWC") and the U.S.-Canada International Joint Com-
mission have existed for decades and exercise jurisdiction over bodies of
water that cross or constitute the boundaries between two nations. These
commissions are tasked to address pollution and environmental quality
issues within their jurisdiction. 221 The United States also has experience
219. Of course, considerations of manageability and adequacy of representation might
counsel the creation of a number of smaller environmental districts as opposed to a single en-
tity spanning the entire border. The discussion here applies equally to both models.
220. With regard to the assessment of environmental fees and taxes to fund environmental
programs at the border, see HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 110, at 60-61.
221. The European Union and some of its precursor entities are similar entities.
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domestically with regional government entities that cross state bounda-
ries.222
The BEQD's substantive authority to make and enforce environ-
mental policy would be similar to that of existing U.S.-Mexico border
institutions, though greater in scope. Merger of such institutions as the
IBWC, the Border Environment Cooperation Commission ("BECC"),
and the North American Development Bank ("NADBank") 223 into the
BEQD would be an efficient and effective way to immediately provide
the new district with a base of financial, technical, and human re-
sources.224 Financial resources could also be generated by taxation of
maquiladora industries and other polluting border businesses. As long as
the BEQD has access to adequate resources and the authority to regulate
and enforce, whether directly by levying taxes or indirectly by control-
ling the actions of other agencies, work toward environmental and pub-
lic-health goals in the border area should be greatly enhanced.
Subjecting the leadership of the BEQD to election by the border
population would be critical to the district's success. Popular elections
would create greater political accountability to the border residents them-
selves. Elections would also make the BEQD more responsive to the
needs of the local people than national governmental agencies in far-off
Washington and Mexico City are. Furthermore, it is likely that a multi-
member elected commission would represent diverse interests, including
communities that might otherwise be disenfranchised or whose interests
would usually be ignored. Finally, creating opportunities to be involved
in the management of the BEQD through electoral participation would
empower the border population, encouraging it to monitor more closely
the work of agencies and to be more involved in the BEQD's work. The
resulting outcomes would enjoy greater legitimacy because local com-
munities would have a greater stake in the decision-making process. Ul-
timately, the BEQD would promote values of participatory democracy in
the management of the border environment.
222. See, e.g., Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-1
(2004); New Hampshire-Vermont Interstate Compact, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-200-B
(2004).
223. For an overview of the BECC and the NADBANK, see e.g., Sanford E. Gaines,
Bridges to a Better Environment: Building Cross-Border Institutions For Environmental Im-
provement in the US.-Mexico Border Area, 12 ARIZ. J. INT. COMP. L. 429 (1995); David A.
Gantz, The North American Development Bank and the Border Environment Cooperation
Commission: A New Approach to Pollution Abatement Along the United States-Mexican Bor-
der, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1027 (1996).
224. Such a change would require amendment of various existing bilateral U.S.-Mexico
treaties. If a simple merger is not possible, creation of new and closer explicit linkages be-
tween existing institutions could increase cooperation with or provide assistance in the imple-
mentation of the mandates of the BEQD.
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The rationale for the BEQD's structure is that it would improve the
relationship between environmental regulators and the people who live
within the border region. Its jurisdictional reach across the border would
formally recognize the connections between the environment and the
communities on both sides. As a regional institution with a leadership
elected by those within its jurisdiction, the commission would also be po-
litically accountable to those it would be charged with serving. Ultimate
control would still remain with the respective party states. They would
retain the power, as they do in any international organization, to change
the BEQD's mandate or abolish it altogether. The drastic nature of abo-
lition, however, would make it unlikely to occur in any but the rarest in-
stances.
There is no question that there are significant obstacles to the crea-
tion of a BEQD. Yet, they are more to be found in the political imagina-
tion than in practical reality. The concepts of regulatory integration,
transboundary governance, and empowerment of individuals, communi-
ties, and other sub-national actors in international regimes are proliferat-
ing all over the world. They can be found in all areas of international
law, including in the growth of multilateral and bilateral economic treaty
systems such as the NAFTA itself, political integration in Europe, and
continuing expansion of multilateral treaty systems into all areas of hu-
man activity. Creation of a BEQD, or some institution with its essential
qualities, appears to be less a question of "if' than "when." For the bor-
der, however, it is also a question of whether such changes will come
soon enough to prevent significant long-term damage to the environment
and the communities living there.
C. The Broader Lessons for International Environmental Treaty
Regimes
The Metales story holds lessons for the management of international
environmental problems beyond the specifics of the border region and
the workings of the CEC. First, process alone cannot serve as the sole
solution to substantive environmental problems. Second, regulatory re-
sponses to many environmental problems cannot be successful without
addressing the underlying economic pressures, social justice demands,
and ecological realities. Finally, mechanisms that make officials politi-
cally accountable to the people who are to be benefited or protected by
international environmental agreements are critical to the success of in-
ternational structures. In the border region, such responses may be em-
bodied, as I have proposed here, in a binational special government dis-
trict.
The critical question for those with interests extending beyond the
U.S.-Mexico border to cross-continental or global environmental issues,
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however, is how these lessons can be applied elsewhere. Even though
such issues range far beyond what this article set out to do, it may be
worthwhile to provide at least some guiding thoughts.
First, international organizations cannot focus on cooperative proc-
esses alone without articulating substantive goals. They must have sub-
stantive power to act, whether by providing financial assistance or by
imposing and enforcing regulatory requirements on polluters and other
responsible parties.
Although this lesson may seem too obvious to merit stating, it is
quite difficult to put into practice. Decisions about resource allocation
inherently raise questions about resource availability, policy priorities,
and opportunity costs. Granting an international organization the sub-
stantive power to regulate means giving up a measure of national sover-
eignty. If commitments to environmental protection goals are to be more
than lip service, however, governments must back them up with re-
sources.
225
Second, incorporating related nonenvironmental issues encounters
significant impediments. They may come under the aegis of interna-
tional organizations such as the World Trade Organization that do not
have specific mandates with respect to the environment. In a sense, the
lack of opportunities for formal linkages among many international or-
ganizations makes it harder to integrate the underlying issues into a co-
herent agenda. Short of merging such organizations into a single entity,
changing their underlying missions to incorporate environmental protec-
tion would be an appropriate intermediate step.
Finally, the problem of political accountability seems to suggest a
significant limitation on the applicability of the border model to address
global environmental issues. Accountability to a community presumes
that there is a community of interests and values to which the organiza-
tion can be accountable. 226 The U.S.-Mexico border region certainly is
such an integrated community and environment. Global and cross-
continental environmental problems, on the other hand, span a much
greater diversity of cultures, communities, and interests. The lessons of
the border do not seem to translate easily.
A community of interests need not be geographically based, how-
ever. If the goal of political accountability is to ensure the responsive-
ness of international environmental institutions to communities con-
cerned about environmental protection and public-health issues,
225. Where significant resources have already been committed to environmental issues,
for example by institutions such as the World Bank, the first task is to coordinate the use of
such disparate resources within an integrated agenda.
226. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge
for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT. L. 596, 615-17 (1999).
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environmental advocacy organizations and community activists have im-
portant stakes in the mission of such institutions. Why not expand par-
ticipation in institutional decision making to include representatives of
various environmental interest groups? To make them real participants in
the decision-making processes of the institution, why not, for example,
give these groups voting power?227
It is in this respect that the Joint Public Advisory Committee
("JPAC") of the CEC, intended to be representative of civil society, is
inadequate.228 There is little question that the JPAC has been important
in shaping the operations of the CEC.229 However, its powers are advi-
sory only. As demonstrated by the Metales matter, it has not been able to
introduce the type of accountability to the CEC that might be expected
from the grant of substantive power within the organization.
Questions about how extensive participation and voting power
should be, and which organization ought to be directly represented, may
be difficult. But they are by no means unanswerable. Regardless of their
specific manifestation, such reforms are bound to result in greater politi-
cal accountability and responsiveness to the interested and affected pub-
lic.
CONCLUSION
A close examination of how the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation and the party states have dealt with the Metales y Derivados
case teaches important lessons about the effectiveness of the citizen
submission process. It also illustrates the difficulties of managing envi-
ronmental problems in developing countries that are associated with in-
ternational trade liberalization and economic development. Undoubt-
edly, the structural and political obstacles are formidable. But there are
also obvious solutions that are conceptually familiar and have been ap-
plied successfully to other international problems. Finding the political
imagination and courage to apply them to the border environment and
the global commons is the challenge ahead for improving the effective-
ness of international environmental governance.
227. It is a model that was suggested for the CEC by environmental organizations. See
Environmental Safeguards for the North American Free Trade Agreement: Priority Recom-
mendations to Negotiators and Congress, With Model Language for Key Provisions (June
1992), reprinted in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 676 (Daniel
Magraw ed., 1995).
228. The U.S.-Mexico Good Neighbor Environmental Board, an advisory body, does not
appear to have a much greater capacity to promote substantive environmental improvement.
229. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 6.
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EPILOGUE
On June 24, 2004, the activists of Colonia Chilpancingo signed an
agreement with the Mexican government to provide for a comprehensive
four-stage, five-year cleanup of the Metales site. For the first stage of
the cleanup, which has already commenced as this article is going to
press, the Mexican government has committed to spending about
US$700,000, including an US$85,000 grant from the EPA. It calls for
the removal of 2,500 tons of toxic materials from the site and was to be
completed by November 2004. The initial US$700,000, however, will
be inadequate to fully rehabilitate the site, and it is unclear where the
funds to finish the job will come from. But the agreement and initial ac-
tions give cause to hope that this time the Mexican government will fol-
low through on substantive remedial action. After a decade of struggle,
victory seems within reach of the affected communities. 230
The agreement is a milestone in the struggles of the communities.
Yet it would be false to believe that it is also a sign of the submission
process' success. Success came in spite of the obstacles in the way. It
was the result of efforts outside of established and normal regulatory
channels. Their success vindicates not the existing regulatory structures
but the communities' and activists' conviction that alternatives had to be
pursued. Maybe, if they can succeed against the odds, the prospect of
reform of the submission process and the structure of environmental
governance at the border stands a chance as well.
230. Victory at Last!, supra note 41.
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